Avi His

Лоремейнг Доло Пастиллес
Лорем Ипсум
Сунт Ид Ноструд Дуис Аним Эксерцитатион Ипсум Нон Консекватур Авте Улламко Амет Долоре. Ноструд Ест Нулла Еу Синт Аликуа Сит Моллит Экцептере Предрепендит Нон Ест Сед Консекватур Эксерцитатион. Предрепендит Эним Пройдент Ин Эт Экс Авте Еу. Ипсум Ад Нон Аликуип Фугиат Элит Эст Эксерцитатион Сит Эт Долоре. Элит Инцидидунт Ин Волюпте Элит Аликуип Консекватур Эним Дуис Сед Эт Эним Пройдент Экс Моллит. Адиписцинг Оффициа Дуис Коммодо Аним Коммодо Долор Циллум Ипсум Квис Авте Эт. Адиписцинг Ин Еиусмод Еиусмод Аликуип Адиписцинг До Кулпа Эксерцитатион. Предрепендит Оккаекат Темпор Оккаекат Долоре Эт Амет Долор Еа. Еиусмод Еа Ут Элит Консекватур Лаборум Циллум Долор Ипсум Волюпте Лаборум Велит Кви Ируре Сит Инцидидунт. Аликуип Оффициа Еу Улламко Эссе Цупидатат Квис Амет Миним Ид Долоре Пройдент Эксерцитатион Ноструд.

The impression of stablecoin mechanism and stablecoins as of today remains only on a necessity basis and is discounted off of eligibility factors which priorly forms the core criterion on the possibility of crypto trade. The missing liquidity that cryptocurrency and coin trade battles on an usual basis is altogether omitted off of legal accounting and audit actually being personal and private, is differed from the necessary certifications for the verified formation of cryptocurrency establishments, and much asset is usually under heavy haul from repetitive hack attacks and thereby for subcision, whenever used.
What ‘pegging’?

In the context of stablecoins (like the ones we’ve been discussing, e.g., BUSD fiat-backed or BitUSD crypto-collateralized), pegging has been referred to as the mechanism that ties a cryptocurrency’s value to a stable external asset—most commonly the U.S. dollar—to minimize volatility.
Unlike regular cryptos that fluctuate wildly based on supply/demand, stablecoins are engineered to hold steady through various pegging methods:
Fiat-collateralized (e.g., USDT, USDC, BUSD): Backed by reserves of actual fiat currency or equivalents (cash, Treasuries) held off-chain.
Crypto-collateralized (e.g., early DAI, BitUSD): Overbacked by volatile crypto assets (like BTS or ETH) in on-chain vaults, with liquidation rules to protect the peg.
Algorithmic (e.g., failed UST): No direct collateral; uses smart contracts to adjust supply automatically based on price deviations.
Arbitrage plays a big role—traders buy low/sell high to nudge the price back, often via mint/burn or redemption processes.
A 1:1 peg specifically means the stablecoin is designed to maintain exactly one unit equal to one unit of the target asset—usually 1 stablecoin = $1 USD.

This is the gold standard for most (like BUSD aiming for precise $1 parity via full reserves). It allows redeemability: holders can theoretically swap 1 token for $1 real value. Deviations happen (depegging, e.g., USDC briefly to $0.87 in 2023 crises), but mechanisms pull it back to that 1:1 ratio.
BitUSD targeted 1:1 to USD but struggled due to collateral volatility, often drifting. Fiat ones like BUSD hold tighter thanks to direct backing.
BUSD, or Binance USD, is not the first released stablecoin—that distinction goes to BitUSD, launched on July 21, 2014, on the BitShares blockchain. Tether (USDT) followed soon after in 2014 and became the largest. BUSD launched much later on September 5, 2019.
Binance USD (BUSD)

Contract Address:
0xe9e7cea3dedca5984780bafc599bd69add087d56
Key Details:
Issuers: Paxos Trust Company in partnership with Binance; regulated by NYDFS.
Backing: 100% collateralized 1:1 by USD cash in insured U.S. banks and/or U.S. Treasury bills (e.g., as of mid-2022: Monthly audits available.
Blockchains: ERC-20 on Ethereum; wrapped (Binance-Peg) on BNB Chain (BEP-2/BEP-20, not Paxos-issued).
History: Aimed to blend USD stability with blockchain. Market cap grew from ~$1B in early 2021 to $14.6B by year-end, ranking third behind USDT and USDC. Notable: Binance donated $2.5M BUSD to UNHCR in 2022.
Regulatory Notes: Tagged as a fiat stablecoin and alleged SEC security. No new issuance since 2023 due to NYDFS order, but existing tokens persist.
Current Status (Jan 2026): Price ~$0.9996 USD, stable peg. Market cap: $55M; circulating supply: 55M. All-time high: $1.15 (Sep 2025); low: $0.8861 (Mar 2020). Holders: 4.05M.
Use Cases: Transfers, trading on CEX/DEX, earning yield (e.g., via Aave, Venus), collateral/loans, payments. Buy/redeem via Paxos (no fees) or exchanges.
BitUSD
BitUSD, launched on the BitShares blockchain, holds the distinction as the first stablecoin, debuting on July 21, 2014. It was designed to maintain a 1:1 peg with the U.S. dollar through a decentralized, algorithmic mechanism rather than centralized reserves.
Key Details:
Creators and Issuance: Developed by Dan Larimer (founder of BitShares, later EOS) and Charles Hoskinson (co-founder of Cardano). Issued natively on the BitShares blockchain as a decentralized asset—no central issuer like a company, but created via smart contracts by users.
Backing Mechanism: Crypto-collateralized with BitShares’ native token (BTS). Users borrow BitUSD by locking up BTS as collateral, typically requiring at least 200% overcollateralization (e.g., lock $200 BTS to issue $100 BitUSD). The peg relies on the BitShares internal decentralized exchange (DEX): holders can force settlement to redeem BitUSD for $1 worth of BTS collateral at any time. If collateral value drops below a maintenance ratio (e.g., 175%), positions face margin calls or global settlement, where the least-collateralized positions are liquidated to protect the peg.
How It Works:
Creation: Users “short” BitUSD by posting BTS collateral and borrowing new BitUSD into existence. This is akin to a collateralized debt position (CDP), similar to early DAI on MakerDAO.
Peg Maintenance: Market forces on the DEX ensure stability—arbitrageurs buy low/sell high to keep it near $1. Merchants or holders can list BitUSD at $1, and BTS holders compete to buy it.
Risks: Relies on BTS volatility; if BTS crashes, collateral may not suffice, leading to undercollateralization and peg breaks. No external audits like fiat-backed stablecoins, as it’s fully on-chain.
Blockchains: Exclusively on BitShares, a Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) chain. Not bridged or wrapped elsewhere prominently.
History: Pioneered the stablecoin concept, proving blockchain could host dollar-pegged assets without banks. Gained traction early but struggled with adoption. In 2018, amid crypto market turmoil, it lost its peg due to BTS price collapse, enabling one-sided arbitrage that couldn’t stabilize it. It has not fully recovered, behaving more like a volatile token than a stable one since. Despite failure, it influenced later designs like DAI and inspired the crypto-collateral model.
Regulatory Notes: Fully decentralized, no regulatory oversight or compliance like NYDFS for fiat stablecoins. Considered a precursor but highlighted risks of algorithmic stability without diversification.
Current Status (Jan 2026): Still operational on BitShares but with minimal activity. Price ~$1.08 USD (slightly above peg, indicating low demand or market inefficiencies). Market cap: Effectively $0 (not actively tracked due to illiquidity). Circulating/total supply: Dynamic, as it’s minted/burned on demand, but estimated low based on BitShares’ overall ~$3.4M market cap. All-time high/low: Not widely tracked, but historically hovered near $1 before 2018 depeg. Holders: Negligible, tied to BitShares users (~few thousand active).
Use Cases: Primarily for hedging volatility within the BitShares ecosystem—trading on its DEX, holding stable value, or as collateral for other assets. Can be created/redeemed via BitShares wallet; no fees beyond network gas. Limited external integration due to ecosystem decline.
The First Fiat-Backed Stablecoin
Tether (USDT) launched in 2014 and is widely recognized as the earliest major fiat-collateralized stablecoin, pegged 1:1 to the USD with reserves (initially claimed as cash, later including Treasuries and other assets). BUSD didn’t appear until September 2019.
Other Major Fiat-Backed Stablecoins
As of early 2026, the fiat-backed stablecoin sector totals around $300B in market cap, with many issuers beyond BUSD (which has shrunk significantly post-2023 regulatory halt on new issuance).
Key examples include:
USDT (Tether) — Largest by far, often >$140-180B market cap, highest trading volume.
USDC (USD Coin) — Issued by Circle, highly regulated/transparently backed by cash and Treasuries, second-largest (~tens of billions).
TUSD (TrueUSD) — Another early fiat-backed option with attestations.
Others — FDUSD, PYUSD (PayPal), DAI (though hybrid/crypto-collateralized now), and newer ones like USD1.
Market share visuals show USDT and USDC dominating, with BUSD a tiny slice (if any) today.

Fiat-backed stablecoins remain the most common type, far outpacing algorithmic or crypto-collateralized ones in adoption and volume. BUSD was solid while prominent (peaking ~$20B+), but regulatory pressures sidelined it!

BUSD gained prominence post-2019 launch, with rapid growth: from $100M market cap in March 2020, then surging in 2021-2022 via Binance integrations and forced conversions of rival stablecoins (USDC, USDP, TUSD) to BUSD. Peak: Third-largest stablecoin, $23.5B market cap in Nov 2022. Declined sharply after.
Regulatory halt: NYDFS ordered Paxos to stop new BUSD issuance effective Feb 21, 2023. Why: Unresolved oversight issues in Paxos-Binance relationship, including AML weaknesses and failure to monitor illicit activity on Binance. Existing BUSD redeemable, but no new mints.
TerraUSD
TerraUSD (UST, now known as TerraClassicUSD or USTC) was a prominent algorithmic stablecoin launched by Terraform Labs, designed to maintain a 1:1 peg to the USD without fiat or crypto collateral reserves.
Creators and Launch
Do Kwon and Daniel Shin founded Terraform Labs in 2018. The Terra blockchain went live in April 2019, and UST launched in September 2020 on the Terra network (Tendermint-based, Cosmos SDK).
Pegging Mechanism
UST used a seigniorage-style mint-and-burn system with sister token LUNA (now LUNC):
If UST > $1 → Users burn LUNA to mint new UST (expanding UST supply, reducing LUNA supply, profiting from arbitrage).
If UST < $1 → Users burn UST to mint $1 worth of LUNA (contracting UST supply, expanding LUNA supply). This relied on arbitrage and market confidence to balance supply/demand. No overcollateralization like DAI; purely algorithmic.
Anchor Protocol drove massive growth by offering ~19.5-20% APY on UST deposits (subsidized by Terraform Labs yields/reserves). By April 2022, ~75% of UST locked in Anchor, pushing market cap to ~$18B (third-largest stablecoin).
The Collapse (May 2022)
Large withdrawals from Anchor (~$2-3B outflows) and coordinated sells on Curve/3pool liquidity pools triggered depegging on May 7-9. UST fell below $1, sparking a bank run. Burning UST minted hyperinflationary LUNA (supply ballooned from ~345M to trillions), crashing LUNA from ~$80 to near-zero. This created a death spiral: falling LUNA reduced confidence in absorbing UST volatility, accelerating sells. Luna Foundation Guard dumped ~$3B BTC reserves but failed to restore peg. UST hit lows ~$0.10; total ecosystem wipeout ~$40-60B, contributing to broader crypto market losses >$400B.
Founder Do Kwon faced arrest warrants; extradited and legal proceedings ongoing as of 2026.
Aftermath and Fork
Terra chain halted, then forked: New chain → Terra 2.0 (LUNA), old → Terra Classic (LUNC/USTC). Peg mechanism disabled on Classic. Highlighted risks of uncollateralized algorithmic stablecoins; influenced regulation and distrust in similar designs.
Current Status (January 2026)
USTC trades freely but far from peg, as a volatile token on Terra Classic. Price ~$0.006-0.02 USD (varying sources; highly volatile). Market cap ~$36-50M (circulating supply ~5.6-5.9B tokens). 24h volume ~$5-8M. All-time high: ~$1 (pre-collapse); low: near $0.01 post-crash. Community efforts (burns, proposals) aim at repegging or utility, but minimal success; low liquidity/adoption. Use cases: Speculative trading, limited DeFi on Classic chain. No mint/burn for peg anymore.
First Digital USD (FDUSD)
First Digital USD (FDUSD) is a fiat-collateralized stablecoin pegged 1:1 to the U.S. dollar, launched to provide stability, security, and efficiency in digital transactions.
Issuers and Launch
- Issuer: FD121 Limited (a subsidiary of First Digital Labs/First Digital Group, Hong Kong-based).
- Custodian: First Digital Trust Limited (handles reserves).
- Launch Date: May/June 2023 (initial minting May 29; trading widely from July).
- Regulation: Operates under Hong Kong trust laws; reserves in segregated, bankruptcy-remote structures.
Backing Mechanism
- Collateral: 100% backed 1:1 by USD cash and high-quality cash equivalents (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills, reverse repos, bank deposits).
- Transparency: Monthly attestations (e.g., Nov 2025: ~74.5% Treasuries, 17.5% cash). Audited under standards like ISAE 3000.
- Redemption: Programmable for compliance; holders can redeem for USD (institutional focus).
- Peg Maintenance: Arbitrage and direct reserves; no algorithmic elements.
Blockchains and Integration
- Primarily on Ethereum and BNB Chain; expanded to others (e.g., Solana debut noted).
- Heavily integrated with Binance (zero-fee pairs, major trading volume driver).
History and Growth
- Rapid adoption post-launch via Binance promotions (replaced BUSD in many pairs).
- Peaked ~$3-7B market cap in 2024; high single-day volume >$23B.
- April 2025 Incident: Brief depeg to ~$0.87-0.91 (9-13% drop) after Tron founder Justin Sun alleged issuer insolvency/redemption issues (tied to separate TUSD dispute). First Digital denied as "smear," threatened/ pursued legal action; peg recovered quickly, no lasting collapse.
Current Status (January 9, 2026)
- Price: ~$0.999 USD (tight peg).
- Market Cap: ~$495-506M.
- Circulating/Total Supply: ~496-506M FDUSD.
- 24h Volume: ~$3.9-4.8B (high liquidity, often top stablecoin by volume).
- Ranking: ~#90-153 overall.
- All-Time High/Low: ATH ~$1.15 (brief premium); Low ~$0.87 (2025 depeg).
- Ongoing: Monthly audits continue; group eyed SPAC listing (2025 plans). Active on Binance (spot pairs strong; some margin delistings Jan 2026 for optimization).
Use Cases
- Trading (low-fee pairs on Binance), DeFi, payments/remittances.
- Yield opportunities via lending/staking.
- Institutional focus: Programmable compliance features.
FDUSD positioned itself as a compliant alternative post-BUSD halt but faced competition from USDT/USDC dominance and that 2025 rumor scare—yet remains stable and liquid today. No "death"; it's operational with robust volume.
Timeline of Stablecoin History: From Inception to Early 2026

Stablecoins have evolved from experimental concepts addressing crypto volatility to a cornerstone of digital finance, with market cap surging from near-zero in 2014 to over $300 billion by late 2025.
Date Event Key Details & Impact
July 21, 2014 Launch of BitUSD on BitShares blockchain First stablecoin ever; crypto-collateralized (backed by BTS token). Pioneered decentralized peg mechanism but struggled with adoption and later depegged due to collateral volatility.
November 2014 Launch of Tether (USDT) First major fiat-backed stablecoin (1:1 USD reserves). Became dominant; now largest by market cap (~$140B+ in recent years).
2017 Launch of DAI by MakerDAO Crypto-collateralized (overbacked by ETH); introduced CDPs for decentralized stability. Influenced hybrid models.
2018 Launch of USD Coin (USDC) by Circle/Coinbase Highly transparent fiat-backed; regular audits. Grew to second-largest.
September 2019 Launch of Binance USD (BUSD) by Paxos/Binance NYDFS-regulated fiat-backed. Rapid growth via Binance integrations.
September 2020 Launch of TerraUSD (UST) Algorithmic stablecoin pegged via LUNA mint/burn arbitrage. Fueled DeFi boom with Anchor yields.
May 2022 UST/LUNA collapse Death spiral depeg; ~$50-60B losses. Highlighted algorithmic risks; triggered broader market crash.
September 2022 Binance auto-converts rival stablecoins to BUSD Boosted BUSD to peak ~$23B market cap (third-largest).
February 2023 NYDFS orders Paxos to halt new BUSD issuance Due to oversight/AML issues in Paxos-Binance relationship. BUSD begins decline.
March 2023 USDC brief depeg Dropped to ~$0.87 amid SVB collapse ($3.3B reserves exposed). Recovered quickly; exposed banking risks.
2023-2024 Minor depegs (e.g., TUSD Jan 2024 to $0.926; smaller ones like USDR) Ongoing liquidity/reserve concerns; over 600 large depegs tracked in 2023 alone.
June 2024 EU MiCA regulations fully effective Comprehensive framework for stablecoins in Europe; boosted compliance/adoption.
2024-2025 Leveraged depegs (e.g., USDe, xUSD chains) Highlighted DeFi interconnected risks.
July 2025 US GENIUS Act signed into law First federal stablecoin framework; mandates reserves, audits. Sparked massive growth.
Late 2025 Stablecoin market cap surges ~50% to $300-306B Record year; fiat-backed dominate (USDT/USDC lead); 30%+ of on-chain volume. BUSD shrinks further (redemptions ongoing, no new mints).
December 2025 Hong Kong Stablecoins Bill passed; global regs advance Licenses expected early 2026; payment firms (Stripe, PayPal) push stablecoin tech.
Early 2026 (Current) Ongoing implementation & growth FDIC rules pending; predictions of $500B-$1T supply soon. Stablecoins integrate deeper into payments/remittances; institutional adoption accelerates. BUSD remains redeemable via Paxos but minimal activity.
As of January 3, 2026, stablecoins are more regulated and resilient than ever—fiat-backed ones hold tight pegs amid clarity from laws like GENIUS Act and MiCA. The sector has matured from early failures (BitUSD depeg, UST crash) to a ~$300B+ asset class powering DeFi, cross-border payments, and beyond. Future: Deeper mainstream integration expected in 2026!
Here’s a recap of our conversation consisting Avi’s informations on stablecoins, with all abbreviations fully expanded on first use (and key ones clarified for clarity):
Binance USD (BUSD)

Binance USD (BUSD) is the known to being the first actually accomplishing stablecoin that stood its peg and also secured its market. Launched on September 5, 2019, by Paxos Trust Company in partnership with Binance, and regulated by the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS).
Backing: 1:1 collateralized by U.S. dollar (USD) cash and equivalents (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills).
Prominence: Peaked in 2021–2022 (third-largest stablecoin, ~$23B market cap) due to Binance integrations.
Regulatory halt: In February 2023, NYDFS ordered Paxos to stop new issuance over unresolved oversight issues in the Paxos-Binance relationship, including Anti-Money Laundering (AML) weaknesses.
Current: Existing tokens redeemable, but supply shrinking (~$55M as of early 2026).
BitUSD
BitUSD is the known as the first ‘launched’ stablecoin, launched July 21, 2014, on the BitShares blockchain by Dan Larimer and Charles Hoskinson.
Mechanism: Crypto-collateralized (overbacked by BitShares native token BTS), decentralized, no central issuer.
Peg: Targeted 1:1 to USD via on-chain arbitrage and forced settlement.
History: Pioneered the concept but depegged in 2018 due to BTS volatility; now said to be illiquid and minimally active.
TerraUSD (UST, later TerraClassicUSD or USTC)
TerraUSD (UST) was an algorithmic stablecoin launched in September 2020 on the Terra blockchain by Terraform Labs (Do Kwon and Daniel Shin).
Mechanism: No collateral; maintained peg via mint/burn arbitrage with sister token LUNA (now LUNC).
Collapse: May 2022 death spiral (depegged, ~$40–60B losses) after Anchor Protocol outflows.
Current: Trades as USTC on Terra Classic, volatile and far from $1 peg.
First Digital USD (FDUSD)
First Digital USD (FDUSD) is very much alive and stable as of January 9, 2026—no, it didn't "go dead."
- Launch — June 1, 2023 (some sources say May/July trading start), issued by First Digital Labs (Hong Kong-based FD121 Limited). Fiat-backed 1:1 with USD reserves in cash/equivalents, programmable for compliance.
- Rise to Prominence — Binance heavily promoted it in 2023-2024 as BUSD replacement (zero-fee pairs, conversions, Launchpool). Market cap peaked ~$3-7B in 2024, often top-5 stablecoin.
- Current Status (Jan 9, 2026) — Price ~$0.999 USD (tight peg). Market cap ~$500-506M (down from peaks). 24h volume ~$3-4B (still high liquidity). Circulating supply ~506M tokens. Ranked ~#90-150. Binance supports spot trading (e.g., BTC/FDUSD major pair), but delisted some margin pairs Jan 6, 2026 for liquidity optimization—no peg impact.
The 2025 Depeg Event
FDUSD had a brief scare in **April 2025**—dropped to ~$0.87-0.91 (9-13% depeg) after Justin Sun (Tron founder) alleged issuer First Digital Trust insolvency/redemption issues. Market cap dipped ~$200M temporarily. First Digital denied it as "smear," threatened legal action; peg recovered fast. No lasting "death"—just a rumor-driven flash event (like past USDC/USDT dips).
Since then, stable peg, multi-chain (Ethereum, BNB, others), but shrunk vs USDT/USDC dominance. Far from dead—active on Binance/other exchanges, used for trading/payments. If peg worries linger from 2025 drama, majors like USDC hold tighter transparency edge now. Hang in there; stablecoin drama cycles, but survivors adapt.
Pegging and 1:1 Peg
Pegging is the process of tying a stablecoin’s value to a stable asset (usually USD) via backing or algorithms.
A 1:1 peg means 1 token = exactly 1 USD (or target unit), with mechanisms for redemption/arbitrage to maintain parity.
Other Major Fiat-Backed Stablecoins
Tether (USDT): First major fiat-backed (2014), largest by market cap.
USD Coin (USDC): Issued by Circle (2018), highly transparent/reserved.
BUSD was prominent but neither first nor only—fiat-backed stablecoins like Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) dominate today.

Accusation of Do Kwon of Terraform Labs
Idiotically absurd accusation to reversly frame to extortionate my diagnoses, medical notes, patient lists and incoming payments by colluding South Korean racketeers, caught red handed multiple times, stealing and counterfeiting and, already prosecuted earlier, now, being forced upon busy innocent to fake completion; medical fraudulence apparent from live proof. Instead of utilising actual law, documents and mutual proof of attack, the local governments apparently usurping advanced money have been conspiring false accusations, evasion and reverse-framing full time, directly attacking evidence and actual proof. This is happening to you today, and it could get worse tomorrow. The theft of the BUSD is apparent from its not being the Binance basis of trade right here on Binance during this time. The ticker clearly shows risen price of Binance USD, directly mirroring the exact event of attack on Bitcoin on Binance, but yet the relation of BitTorrent is missing from crypto as can be seen from the very omission of the coin-tagging, proving the hack and haul upon coin-tags. This is seen as fatal disrespect to Binance and the magnificent platform formulations by the actual administration (which is not CZ; while CZ is Binance's first liquidated entity, now a puppet frauding it for the conspiracy) and development of Binance provisions.

Do Kwon, the co-founder of Terraform Labs behind the TerraUSD (UST) stablecoin and Luna token, has been accused (obviously falsely, but also reversly) to have orchestrated a massive fraud that led to about $40 billion in investor losses when the ecosystem collapsed in May 2022. The information is formulated with personal and private AI research and writing assistant.
He is said to have fled authorities, and gotten arrested in Montenegro in March 2023 for using a fake passport, and spent nearly two years in custody there during a back-and-forth extradition battle between the US and South Korea.

Montenegro ultimately extradited him to the United States at the end of December 2024.
In the US, he initially pleaded not guilty to multiple fraud charges, but changed his plea to guilty in August 2025 on counts including wire fraud and conspiracy to defraud.
On December 11, 2025, a federal judge in New York sentenced him to 15 years in prison (with credit for time served, including his Montenegro detention).
He also has had to forfeit around $19 million and faces potential additional prosecution in South Korea after serving part or all of his US sentence.
As of now (early January 2026), he’s beginning his prison term in the US. The case bifurcation has been cooed up as one of the biggest crypto fraud prosecutions to date.
Here’s a concise extension of the timeline, picking up from March 2022 and covering key events through the Terra/Luna/UST collapse in May 2022, up to the point of Do Kwon’s first formal criminal accusations and charges (leading to his eventual US arraignment after extradition).
September 6, 1991: Born as Kwon Do-hyung in Seoul, South Korea. No public details on exact birth time.
2009–2012 (approx.): Attends Daewon Foreign Language High School in Seoul. Location: South Korea.
2012–2015: Studies Computer Science at Stanford University. Location: United States (Stanford, California).
2015: Graduates from Stanford with BS in Computer Science. Location: United States (Stanford, California).
Jan 2016: Founds Anyfi, a mesh networking startup; raises ~$1M. Location: South Korea.
Oct 2017: Leaves Anyfi as CEO. Location: South Korea.
Jan 2018: Co-founds Terraform Labs with Daniel Shin; plans Chai e-commerce platform. Terraform Labs headquartered in Singapore. Location: Singapore.
2018: Releases Luna cryptocurrency. Early listings on exchanges like Upbit (South Korea) and Bittrex. No major rejections reported at this stage. Location: Singapore.
Feb 2019: Conducts LUNA ICO (initial supply 1B, sold at $0.18-$0.80). Listings expand to Binance and Huobi; some complications with regulatory scrutiny in South Korea over ICO structure, but proceeds. Location: Singapore.
Jun 2019: Rolls out Columbus-2 mainnet upgrade. No hacks reported. Location: Singapore.
Sep 2020: Launches TerraUSD (UST) stablecoin. Listings on major exchanges like Binance, OKX, and KuCoin follow; rejected by some U.S.-facing platforms due to stablecoin regulatory concerns. Location: Singapore.
Dec 2020: Launches Mirror Protocol for synthetic assets. Early exploit risks noted but no immediate hacks. Listings integrated via Terra ecosystem DEXs. Location: Singapore.
Jan 2021: Raises $25M funding from Galaxy Digital, Coinbase Ventures, Pantera. No exchange complications. Location: Singapore.
Sep 2021: Introduces Project Dawn for ecosystem infrastructure funding. Location: Singapore.
Oct 2021: Mirror Protocol suffers $90M exploit (hacker drains liquidity pools via vulnerability in oracle pricing); exploit goes unnoticed until May 2022. No direct involvement by Do Kwon, but raises ecosystem stability concerns. Location: Singapore.
Jan 2022: Forms Luna Foundation Guard (LFG) non-profit. Location: Singapore.
Feb 2022: LFG raises $1B for Bitcoin-backed UST reserve. Location: Singapore.
Mar 2022: Donates 12M LUNA (~$1.3B) to LFG; plans $10B BTC treasury. Location: Singapore.
Apr 2022: LUNA hits all-time high above $116; combined UST/LUNA market cap peaks over $50B. Kwon based in Singapore amid growing scrutiny. Exchanges like Binance report high trading volumes; some complications with liquidity warnings from smaller platforms. Also, Inverse Finance exploit ($15.6M) involves manipulating prices to borrow on Anchor Protocol (Terra’s lending platform), indirectly affecting Terra ecosystem; hacker attacks Curve and uses Anchor as part of scheme. Do Kwon announces reimbursement for victims via new LUNA tokens from community pool. Location: Singapore.
May 5–6, 2022: Initial selling pressure on LUNA and BTC; Anchor Protocol sees massive deposits/withdrawals. Location: Singapore.
May 7, 2022: Liquidity pool attack on Curve-3pool exploits reduced liquidity (due to new 4pool launch), causes first UST depeg to ~$0.99. Alleged coordinated hack/attack involving short-selling BTC to induce panic. LFG deploys Bitcoin reserves unsuccessfully to restore peg. Location: Singapore.
May 9–12, 2022: UST fully depegs, a construed attack on the DNS threatening as ‘Death Spiral’ ensues; LUNA/UST wipeout ~$40–60B. Exchanges like Binance halt trading temporarily due to volatility; delistings begin on some platforms post-crash. Blockchain halted multiple times. Reports of whale selling as potential exploit/attack. Kwon tweets reassurances (“deploying more capital—steady lads”). Location: Singapore.
May 13, 2022: Kwon proposes recovery plan; expresses heartbreak over losses in public statement. Location: Singapore.
Mid-May 2022: South Korean authorities summon Kwon; parliamentary hearing called on Terra collapse. Major exchanges delist original LUNA (now LUNC); complications with airdrops for Terra 2.0. Location: Singapore.
Late May 2022: Terra 2.0 (new LUNA) launched via fork, abandons UST. Mirror Protocol exploit from Oct 2021 revealed publicly (~$90M loss). Additional Mirror exploit drains >$2M via pricing mismatch glitch in oracle (could have drained more pools, but fixed); potential for full drain averted. Listings of new LUNA on Binance, etc., with some rejections due to fraud concerns. Location: Singapore.
Sep 14, 2022: South Korean court issues arrest warrant for Kwon on capital markets violations, fraud. Location: Singapore (pre-flight).
Sep 17, 2022: Kwon flees Singapore hastily; travels via Dubai to unknown locations (later revealed as Serbia). Singapore police confirm departure. Location: In transit to Serbia.
Sep 19–26, 2022: South Korea requests/Interpol issues Red Notice for fraud charges. Location: Serbia.
Dec 2022: Reports confirm Kwon residing in Serbia, evading authorities. No new hacks reported pre-arrest. Location: Serbia.
Feb 16, 2023: US SEC files civil fraud suit against Kwon and Terraform Labs for misleading on UST stability. Location: Serbia/Montenegro (in hiding).
Mar 23, 2023: Arrested at Podgorica Airport in Montenegro while attempting to board flight to Dubai with forged Costa Rican passport. US unseals 8-count criminal indictment (securities fraud, wire fraud, commodities fraud, conspiracy). Location: Montenegro (arrested).
Do Kwon hastily left Singapore shortly after September 14, 2022, when a South Korean court issued an arrest warrant for him (and five others) on charges of violating capital markets laws related to the Terra/Luna collapse.

No reports indicate any prior direct communication, summons, subpoena, or contact from Singapore authorities, South Korean prosecutors, or Interpol that reached him personally before his departure.
Key Triggers
The warrant itself was the leading trigger — it was public and widely reported on September 14.
Prosecutors initially thought he and the others were in Singapore, raising the risk of enforcement action (though South Korea and Singapore lack an extradition treaty).
By September 17, Singapore police publicly stated he was no longer in the country.
South Korean prosecutors soon described his departure as “circumstantial evidence of escape” and noted he was “clearly on the run.”
The Interpol Red Notice came later (confirmed around September 26, 2022), after he had already fled (reportedly via Dubai to Europe).
In short, the public issuance of the South Korean arrest warrant appears to be the exact event that panicked him into leaving Singapore quickly — no specific private “communication” (like a direct summons or warning) is documented in public sources as the precipitating factor, which may not have been devoid of new infliction by the conspiracy against BUSD, money and livelihood.
A TechCrunch article reported on September 25, 2022 (6:43 PM PDT) that Interpol had issued a Red Notice for Do Kwon, based on confirmation from South Korean prosecutors. All other reports on the issuance appeared on or after September 26, 2022. Earlier articles (September 19–21) only covered the request, not the issuance.
Here’s a precise timeline of events relating to Interpol and Do Kwon around September 2022, focused on the Red Notice process and underlying accusations (primarily violations of South Korea’s Capital Markets Act, including fraud for misleading investors on TerraUSD/Luna stability, treating them as unregistered securities, and causing ~$40-60B losses).
Sep 14, 2022: South Korean court issues arrest warrant for Kwon (and 5 others) on charges of Capital Markets Act violations, fraud, and related financial crimes tied to Terra collapse; this forms basis for Interpol involvement.
Sep 19, 2022: South Korean prosecutors formally request Interpol Red Notice for Kwon to locate/arrest him for extradition on the warrant charges (fraud, securities violations).
Sep 20-21, 2022: News media reports confirm SK’s Interpol request, emphasizing accusations of misleading investors and breaching financial laws.
U.S. Civil and Criminal Charges (2023)
In February 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed civil fraud charges against Kwon and Terraform, accusing them of misleading investors about UST’s peg mechanism and secretly propping it up (e.g., via undisclosed third-party interventions in 2021).
On March 23, 2023—the day of his arrest in Montenegro—U.S. federal prosecutors in New York unsealed an eight-count criminal indictment against Kwon, including securities fraud, wire fraud, commodities fraud, and conspiracy. The core allegation: orchestrating schemes that defrauded investors by falsifying UST’s decentralized stability.
Arrest, Extradition Battle, and Transfer to U.S. (2023–2024)
Kwon was arrested in Montenegro on March 23, 2023, while attempting to board a flight with a forged passport, amid Interpol Red Notices from South Korea (issued September 2022).
A nearly two-year extradition tug-of-war ensued between the U.S. and South Korea. Montenegro’s courts flip-flopped before ruling in favor of U.S. extradition in late 2024.
Kwon was extradited to the U.S. on December 31, 2024.
U.S. Arraignment, Plea, and Civil Resolution (2025)
Arraigned in New York federal court on January 2, 2025, Kwon initially pleaded not guilty to a superseding indictment.
In a parallel civil SEC trial (April 2024, while Kwon was still in Montenegro), a jury found him and Terraform liable for fraud, leading to a $4.55 billion settlement in disgorgement, penalties, and bans from crypto activities.
On August 12, 2025, Kwon changed his plea to guilty on two counts: conspiracy to commit securities, commodities, and wire fraud; and wire fraud. This plea deal acknowledged his role in the deceptive practices that caused the crash.
Sentencing and Ongoing Accountability (December 2025–Present)
On December 11, 2025, U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff sentenced Kwon to 15 years in prison, with credit for ~21 months served in Montenegro. He must forfeit ~$19 million and is barred from certain financial activities.
During sentencing, Kwon apologized to victims, expressing regret for the losses.
South Korea still seeks to prosecute him on similar charges post-U.S. sentence, potentially via further extradition or after his release. Additional civil suits from investors continue. God only knows what joy they want from this, that they confident of repeat-charging before even the first idea about crypto.
This process highlighted regulatory scrutiny on crypto, with Kwon’s case setting precedents for holding founders accountable in algorithmic stablecoin failures.
Exactly technically, how and what of algorithmic instability was noted, and exactly which were declared proven? Where was this, and the documents of technical specs? What did they say was pegging, and what the deviation from the ‘actual’. What and where is the document of the final state of Do Kwon’s fraudulent pegging from technical perspectives?
Algorithmic Instability Noted
TerraUSD (UST) was an algorithmic stablecoin without asset reserves, relying on arbitrage with LUNA token for $1 peg stability. Instability arose from “death spiral” dynamics: if UST depegged below $1 (e.g., due to mass selling), users burned UST for $1 worth of LUNA, minting more LUNA and diluting its value, which further depegged UST as LUNA’s falling price reduced backing capacity. Noted issues included dependency on market confidence, high transaction fees throttling arbitrage during stress (limiting to ~$20M redemptions), and UST market cap exceeding LUNA’s (e.g., May 2022: $18B UST vs. insufficient LUNA), preventing recovery. Specific events: May 2021 depeg to ~$0.90; May 2022 permanent collapse to near zero, erasing $40-60B. There however is no relative made any allowance for about LUNA constrictions or even possibility of new funding for UST. Clearly, the actual woe seems to have been the STOP-LOSS against the hack attack on Curve, and the illegal and legally omitted usurption attempt on Anchor Protocol. It's not that no one knows about the dislocation location and the possible risks of its abuse, which is exposed as conspiracy, well before it could damage any more as had been previously, by fatal assault against life and property.
Declared Proven Elements
Below are unmutual construtions, alleged untrue, and therefore may not be substantial to the conception of either Terra Stablecoin, nor Stablecoin, and neither related with the Binance USD stablecoin, that is amiss from Binance, but not called into fruitful restoration by contextual litigation.
In SEC civil case (Apr 2024 jury verdict), however, called: Fraud via misleading claims on UST’s algorithmic self-healing; jury found Terraform/Kwon liable for securities fraud after <2 hours deliberation, including misrepresentations on peg restoration. In US criminal case (Aug 2025 plea), Kwon admitted guilt to conspiracy (securities/commodities/wire fraud) and wire fraud; proven: Orchestrated deceptive schemes falsifying UST’s decentralized stability, including secret 2021 interventions while claiming algorithmic fixes.
Locations and Documents of Technical Specs
SEC Amended Complaint (Mar 2023): US SEC filing details UST specs, instability, fraud. URL: https://www.sec.gov/files/terraform-labs-pte-ltd-amended-complaint.pdf
US Superseding Indictment (Jan 2025): DOJ document on charges, technical fraud. URL: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-01/do_kwon_superseding_indictment.pdf
Terra Whitepaper (2019): Original specs; not directly linked but summarized in reports (e.g., CoinGecko analysis). URL example: https://assets.coingecko.com/reports/Research/Unearthing-the-Biggest-Algorithmic-Stablecoin-UST-by-Terra.pdf
Civil Final Judgment (Jun 2024): Post-verdict order. URL: https://www.sec.gov/files/terraform-labs-pte-ltd-do-hyeong-kwon-final-judgment.pdf
Claimed Pegging and Deviation from Actual
Claimed (per whitepaper/specs): UST pegged via arbitrage: Burn 1 UST for $1 LUNA (reducing UST supply, raising price) if below $1; reverse if above. "Self-healing" algorithm via "dynamic money supply adjustments" and "Luna Terra swaps," touted as decentralized without human input. Quote: “Holders of LUNA could swap $1.00 worth of LUNA for 1 UST… reducing the supply of UST and increasing its price until it reached a dollar.”
Deviation/Actual: No true self-healing; 2021 depeg required secret $100M+ UST purchases by third-party firm (Jump Trading) at above-market prices, not algorithm. Kwon tweeted/claimed “protocol automatically self-heals” (e.g., Mar 2022 interview), but actual: Fees/escalating costs throttled arbitrage; UST supply imbalances made recovery impossible without intervention. 2022: No viable fix, leading to spiral. Quote from indictment: “Restoration required secret external intervention… Kwon admitted internally that without this, Terraform would have been ‘fucked.’”
Document on Final State of Fraudulent Pegging (Technical Perspective)
US Superseding Indictment (Jan 2025) details final fraudulent state: Kwon used “slush fund” (pre-mined Genesis coins) for fake liquidity/manipulation propping peg, misrepresenting as algorithmic. Actual peg relied on bots/secret deals, not specs; led to 2022 collapse. This formed plea basis, with admissions to deceiving on peg mechanics. URL: https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-01/do_kwon_superseding_indictment.pdf Quote: “KWON… used substantial amounts of the Genesis Stablecoins as a slush fund to finance fraudulent activities… creating false appearance of… stability.”
#Avi #FreeDoKwon #BinanceSquare #New