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COINRANK MORNING UPDATE
Standard Chartered predicts #Ethereum will reach $40,000 by 2030.
#AlphaTON expands its Telegram-based decentralized AI network Cocoon through a partnership with #Nvidia.
Tempo launches a cryptographically protected mainnet explorer.
#Flow : Counterfeit FLOW tokens have been recovered and will be destroyed on January 30th.
US Democratic Party-related political committees launch BlueVault, a cryptocurrency fundraising platform.
#CoinRank #GM
#AlphaTON expands its Telegram-based decentralized AI network Cocoon through a partnership with #Nvidia.
Tempo launches a cryptographically protected mainnet explorer.
#Flow : Counterfeit FLOW tokens have been recovered and will be destroyed on January 30th.
US Democratic Party-related political committees launch BlueVault, a cryptocurrency fundraising platform.
#CoinRank #GM
翻訳
🚨 CZ WARNS MEME COIN TRADERS: FOLLOWING TWEETS ≠ PROFITS
CZ @cz_binance says he’s not against memecoins — and even likes memes — but chasing every meme token created from his random tweets is “almost guaranteed to lose money.”
💬 “I tweet silly, unfunny jokes most of the time. I’m usually not even thinking about memes.”
📉 Takeaway: hype-driven trading ≠ strategy. #Memecoins may go viral, but blind #FOMO often ends the same way.
#CZ #CryptoNews #Binance
CZ @cz_binance says he’s not against memecoins — and even likes memes — but chasing every meme token created from his random tweets is “almost guaranteed to lose money.”
💬 “I tweet silly, unfunny jokes most of the time. I’m usually not even thinking about memes.”
📉 Takeaway: hype-driven trading ≠ strategy. #Memecoins may go viral, but blind #FOMO often ends the same way.
#CZ #CryptoNews #Binance
翻訳
Who Defines “Facts”? The Truth of Power and the Space for Malice in Polymarket’s Resolution Mecha...
Polymarket intervened to clarify a geopolitical market outcome, highlighting ambiguity in predefined rules and sparking controversy over fairness and interpretation in prediction markets.
Final resolution depends on human proposals and UMA governance voting, involving bonds, challenges, and economic incentives, but leaving room for manipulation by external interests.
Gray areas in rule setting and governance participation undermine user trust; prediction markets risk disputes because real-world events resist clear binary definitions.
Polymarket’s resolution mechanism faces controversy as ambiguity in rules and governance voting by UMA token holders raises fairness concerns and trust issues.
Polymarket has once again found itself embroiled in controversy over fairness.
The incident stems from the “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela by…?” prediction market. On January 4, Polymarket intervened to clarify that “the previous U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Maduro does not meet the definition of an invasion.” This statement caused the price of YES shares for the January 31st outcome (i.e., betting that the U.S. would invade Venezuela before January 31) to plummet, directly impacting the actual interests of many users.
Odaily Note: The chart shows the price trend of YES shares for the January 31st outcome. The inflection point corresponds to the time when Polymarket officially intervened with the clarification.
This is not the first time Polymarket has faced similar controversy. Last year, we discussed analogous cases in two articles: “Polymarket Hit by Oracle Manipulation Attack: Can Whales Use Voting Power to ‘Reverse Black and White’?” and “Polymarket Faces Another Truth Dispute: What Zelenskyy Wears Will Determine the Fate of $140 Million“, where we briefly analyzed Polymarket’s result resolution logic.
In the discussion surrounding this latest event, we noticed that while many readers are aware that Polymarket relies on the oracle protocol UMA for resolutions, they are unclear about how this process actually works. Therefore, Odaily is publishing another article to dissect its resolution mechanism and explore the potential gray areas that could lead to result disputes.
Predefined Rules and Supplementary Explanations
First, any prediction market on Polymarket is launched with a predefined set of rules. These rules clearly state the conditions for determining the outcome, the validity period, and anticipate how to judge under various unexpected circumstances.
Taking the “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela by…?” market as an example. As shown above, the text under “Rules” constitutes the predefined rules for this market. The judgment conditions and validity period are: If the United States launches a military offensive aimed at controlling any part of Venezuelan territory between November 3, 2025, and January 31, 2026 (11:59 PM ET), the resolution is YES; otherwise, it is NO.
However, even with anticipation for various contingencies, sometimes events unfold in unexpected ways. In this case, no one could have predicted that a head of state could be so abruptly captured by another power. Therefore, in rare instances, Polymarket will personally intervene to provide supplementary explanations for unforeseen circumstances that were not anticipated when the market was created, offering further clarification of the rules. — The decision to clarify is not made unilaterally by Polymarket; users with doubts can proactively request clarification in the #market-review channel on Polymarket’s Discord.
Observant readers may have noticed that below the “Rules” section in the image above, there is a section with lighter font labeled “Additional context,” with a more recent update date (the predefined rules were posted on December 18 last year, while this content was added on January 4). This is precisely the supplementary explanation Polymarket provided in this instance. The specific content is: “This market concerns US military action intended to establish control. President Trump has stated he will ‘manage’ Venezuela in the context of ongoing negotiations with the Venezuelan government, but this statement alone is insufficient to characterize the ‘capture and extraction’ mission aimed at capturing Maduro as an invasion.”
In simple terms, Polymarket does not consider the U.S. capture of Maduro to be defined as an invasion of Venezuela and therefore does not support resolving the outcome as YES based on this event.
Let’s set aside the question of whether Polymarket’s supplementary explanation is reasonable. What’s more important to note here is that the validity period for this market (January 31) has not yet ended, meaning it has not entered the final resolution process. Emphasizing this point serves two purposes: first, to remind everyone that all current disputes essentially stem from rule ambiguity, unrelated to the resolution phase; second, to clarify that this controversy is not yet settled, and users’ current losses are actually unrealized losses. Everything depends on the final resolution.
So, how is the final resolution process executed?
The Resolution Process: Results Are Proposed by People
For any prediction market on Polymarket, the final resolution process requires someone to propose an outcome. Using the previous market as an example, the window for proposing a resolution is located under “Rules” at “Propose resolution.”
Of course, not everyone can casually propose random results. UMA and Polymarket have designed two layers of restrictions: economic incentives and a whitelist requirement.
The economic incentive means that proposing a result requires depositing a bond in USDC (typically 750 USDC, higher for some markets). After submission, there is a challenge window (typically 2 hours). If no one challenges during this period, the result is deemed valid and will be used as the basis for the final market resolution, which will not be changed. The proposer then receives a reward (typically 5 USDC). If challenged, it enters a dispute phase, where the proposer risks losing their bond (discussed in detail later). In essence, if someone proposes a result just to cause trouble, the risk far outweighs the potential reward.
Odaily Note: Clicking on “Propose resolution” in the market reveals the bond requirement and reward amount for proposing a result.
The whitelist restriction refers to the fact that Polymarket initially allowed anyone to propose resolutions. However, to improve resolution efficiency, it introduced a whitelist maintained jointly with Risk Labs in August last year. Since then, only whitelisted addresses can propose results. There are three ways to join the whitelist: 1) Join the Risk Labs team, 2) Join the Polymarket team, or 3) Have submitted over 20 proposals with an accuracy rate exceeding 95% in the past three months. All addresses can be queried via this contract. Initially, there were only 40 addresses, but the number has significantly expanded since.
The Dispute Phase: A Game of Economic Interests
As mentioned in the previous section, if a proposed result receives no challenges during the challenge window, it is deemed valid. This is the final outcome for the vast majority of markets. However, in rare cases where a challenge is raised, how is the resolution determined?
First, it’s important to note that, similar to proposing a result, challenges cannot be raised frivolously — the challenger must post an equal bond in USDC (typically still 750 USDC) to confront the proposer. In other words, both parties must put equal stakes on the table. Unlike the proposer, the challenger does not need to provide a complete alternative result; they only need to point out a specific error in the proposer’s result.
Once a valid challenge is confirmed, the UMA community will debate the issue. This phase typically lasts 24-48 hours (voting occurs the next day, with at least 24 hours reserved for discussion). Anyone wishing to provide evidence for the discussion can do so in the #evidence-rationale and #voting-discussion channels on the UMA Discord server.
After the debate, UMA token holders will vote on the matter (this process takes approximately another 48 hours). Four possible outcomes can occur:
Proposer Wins: The proposer retrieves their bond plus half of the challenger’s bond as a bounty. The challenger loses their bond.
Challenger Wins: The challenger retrieves their bond plus half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Too Early: This outcome applies to proposals where the relevant event is not yet settled, such as an ongoing sports match result. The challenger receives a refund plus half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Split (50:50): The rarest case. In this scenario, the challenger retrieves their bond and receives half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Two points are noteworthy regarding the above voting outcomes.
First, in three of the four potential scenarios, the challenger can profit, while the proposer profits in only one. This is an intentional design by UMA, using the imbalance of risk and reward between the two parties to incentivize higher accuracy in proposed results. Since a challenger only needs to point out one flaw to win, the proposer must provide a result that is as accurate and compliant with standards as possible.
The second point is that UMA’s governance voting power holds absolute authority over the final result. In other words, the multi-billion-dollar prediction market spectacle built by Polymarket is, at its core, supported by a protocol with a fully diluted valuation of only around $100 million.
Exploring the Gray Areas
Combining the analysis of Polymarket’s resolution process above with a review of historical real dispute cases, it’s not difficult to see that there are certain gray areas in both the rule-setting/supplementary explanation phase during market operation and the final resolution process that can lead to controversy.
First, regarding the rule-setting and supplementary explanation phase, the essence of its ambiguity lies both in the fact that written rules sometimes cannot cover real-world variables and in the fact that the same textual description can often be interpreted in different ways. For example, in last year’s “Did Zelenskyy Wear a Suit?” incident, the rules did not explicitly state whether “military-style suits count as suits.” While Polymarket clarified in its supplementary explanation that “reliable reporting has not confirmed whether Zelenskyy wore a suit,” it did not define what constitutes “reliable reporting.” Such ambiguities inevitably lead to disputes.
If Polymarket, as the platform operator, could maintain neutrality, it might not provoke public anger every time, but the situation is hardly ideal. Polymarket’s operating entity is based in the United States, which means the regulatory environment and political context it faces make it difficult to remain completely neutral on all geopolitical issues. For instance, in the current “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela?” matter, when it involves U.S. military or diplomatic actions itself, rule interpretations tend to lean towards more conservative, “non-militarized” language. This is understandable, but ultimately, it’s the users who suffer the losses.
As for the resolution process, the source of ambiguity points directly to the potential for manipulation in UMA voting. Although UMA designed a reward/punishment game mechanism to constrain proposal behavior and improve result accuracy, this mechanism only constrains economic interests within its system. When external profit opportunities exist, theoretical room for malicious action remains. This is not unfounded suspicion. In last year’s “Ukrainian Rare Earth” incident, a UMA whale manipulated voting power to forcibly reverse the outcome, resulting in $7 million worth of bets being settled incorrectly.
The existence of these gray areas is the root cause of frequent accusations that Polymarket is unfair and represents a structural issue prediction markets need to address. In fact, any prediction market involving complex real-world events inevitably faces a triple dilemma: First, real-world events themselves often cannot be clearly binarized; geopolitics, military actions, and diplomatic games are inherently full of gray areas. Second, rules must be expressed in language, but language naturally allows for interpretive space. Third, once a resolution mechanism introduces human or governance participation, it inevitably becomes subject to interest-based博弈.
From a user’s perspective, perhaps you need to realize early on — in prediction markets, what you are betting on is not “what will happen in the world,” but “how the rules will ultimately be interpreted.”
Original link
〈Who Defines “Facts”? The Truth of Power and the Space for Malice in Polymarket’s Resolution Mechanism〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
Final resolution depends on human proposals and UMA governance voting, involving bonds, challenges, and economic incentives, but leaving room for manipulation by external interests.
Gray areas in rule setting and governance participation undermine user trust; prediction markets risk disputes because real-world events resist clear binary definitions.
Polymarket’s resolution mechanism faces controversy as ambiguity in rules and governance voting by UMA token holders raises fairness concerns and trust issues.
Polymarket has once again found itself embroiled in controversy over fairness.
The incident stems from the “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela by…?” prediction market. On January 4, Polymarket intervened to clarify that “the previous U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Maduro does not meet the definition of an invasion.” This statement caused the price of YES shares for the January 31st outcome (i.e., betting that the U.S. would invade Venezuela before January 31) to plummet, directly impacting the actual interests of many users.
Odaily Note: The chart shows the price trend of YES shares for the January 31st outcome. The inflection point corresponds to the time when Polymarket officially intervened with the clarification.
This is not the first time Polymarket has faced similar controversy. Last year, we discussed analogous cases in two articles: “Polymarket Hit by Oracle Manipulation Attack: Can Whales Use Voting Power to ‘Reverse Black and White’?” and “Polymarket Faces Another Truth Dispute: What Zelenskyy Wears Will Determine the Fate of $140 Million“, where we briefly analyzed Polymarket’s result resolution logic.
In the discussion surrounding this latest event, we noticed that while many readers are aware that Polymarket relies on the oracle protocol UMA for resolutions, they are unclear about how this process actually works. Therefore, Odaily is publishing another article to dissect its resolution mechanism and explore the potential gray areas that could lead to result disputes.
Predefined Rules and Supplementary Explanations
First, any prediction market on Polymarket is launched with a predefined set of rules. These rules clearly state the conditions for determining the outcome, the validity period, and anticipate how to judge under various unexpected circumstances.
Taking the “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela by…?” market as an example. As shown above, the text under “Rules” constitutes the predefined rules for this market. The judgment conditions and validity period are: If the United States launches a military offensive aimed at controlling any part of Venezuelan territory between November 3, 2025, and January 31, 2026 (11:59 PM ET), the resolution is YES; otherwise, it is NO.
However, even with anticipation for various contingencies, sometimes events unfold in unexpected ways. In this case, no one could have predicted that a head of state could be so abruptly captured by another power. Therefore, in rare instances, Polymarket will personally intervene to provide supplementary explanations for unforeseen circumstances that were not anticipated when the market was created, offering further clarification of the rules. — The decision to clarify is not made unilaterally by Polymarket; users with doubts can proactively request clarification in the #market-review channel on Polymarket’s Discord.
Observant readers may have noticed that below the “Rules” section in the image above, there is a section with lighter font labeled “Additional context,” with a more recent update date (the predefined rules were posted on December 18 last year, while this content was added on January 4). This is precisely the supplementary explanation Polymarket provided in this instance. The specific content is: “This market concerns US military action intended to establish control. President Trump has stated he will ‘manage’ Venezuela in the context of ongoing negotiations with the Venezuelan government, but this statement alone is insufficient to characterize the ‘capture and extraction’ mission aimed at capturing Maduro as an invasion.”
In simple terms, Polymarket does not consider the U.S. capture of Maduro to be defined as an invasion of Venezuela and therefore does not support resolving the outcome as YES based on this event.
Let’s set aside the question of whether Polymarket’s supplementary explanation is reasonable. What’s more important to note here is that the validity period for this market (January 31) has not yet ended, meaning it has not entered the final resolution process. Emphasizing this point serves two purposes: first, to remind everyone that all current disputes essentially stem from rule ambiguity, unrelated to the resolution phase; second, to clarify that this controversy is not yet settled, and users’ current losses are actually unrealized losses. Everything depends on the final resolution.
So, how is the final resolution process executed?
The Resolution Process: Results Are Proposed by People
For any prediction market on Polymarket, the final resolution process requires someone to propose an outcome. Using the previous market as an example, the window for proposing a resolution is located under “Rules” at “Propose resolution.”
Of course, not everyone can casually propose random results. UMA and Polymarket have designed two layers of restrictions: economic incentives and a whitelist requirement.
The economic incentive means that proposing a result requires depositing a bond in USDC (typically 750 USDC, higher for some markets). After submission, there is a challenge window (typically 2 hours). If no one challenges during this period, the result is deemed valid and will be used as the basis for the final market resolution, which will not be changed. The proposer then receives a reward (typically 5 USDC). If challenged, it enters a dispute phase, where the proposer risks losing their bond (discussed in detail later). In essence, if someone proposes a result just to cause trouble, the risk far outweighs the potential reward.
Odaily Note: Clicking on “Propose resolution” in the market reveals the bond requirement and reward amount for proposing a result.
The whitelist restriction refers to the fact that Polymarket initially allowed anyone to propose resolutions. However, to improve resolution efficiency, it introduced a whitelist maintained jointly with Risk Labs in August last year. Since then, only whitelisted addresses can propose results. There are three ways to join the whitelist: 1) Join the Risk Labs team, 2) Join the Polymarket team, or 3) Have submitted over 20 proposals with an accuracy rate exceeding 95% in the past three months. All addresses can be queried via this contract. Initially, there were only 40 addresses, but the number has significantly expanded since.
The Dispute Phase: A Game of Economic Interests
As mentioned in the previous section, if a proposed result receives no challenges during the challenge window, it is deemed valid. This is the final outcome for the vast majority of markets. However, in rare cases where a challenge is raised, how is the resolution determined?
First, it’s important to note that, similar to proposing a result, challenges cannot be raised frivolously — the challenger must post an equal bond in USDC (typically still 750 USDC) to confront the proposer. In other words, both parties must put equal stakes on the table. Unlike the proposer, the challenger does not need to provide a complete alternative result; they only need to point out a specific error in the proposer’s result.
Once a valid challenge is confirmed, the UMA community will debate the issue. This phase typically lasts 24-48 hours (voting occurs the next day, with at least 24 hours reserved for discussion). Anyone wishing to provide evidence for the discussion can do so in the #evidence-rationale and #voting-discussion channels on the UMA Discord server.
After the debate, UMA token holders will vote on the matter (this process takes approximately another 48 hours). Four possible outcomes can occur:
Proposer Wins: The proposer retrieves their bond plus half of the challenger’s bond as a bounty. The challenger loses their bond.
Challenger Wins: The challenger retrieves their bond plus half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Too Early: This outcome applies to proposals where the relevant event is not yet settled, such as an ongoing sports match result. The challenger receives a refund plus half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Split (50:50): The rarest case. In this scenario, the challenger retrieves their bond and receives half of the proposer’s bond as a bounty. The proposer loses their bond.
Two points are noteworthy regarding the above voting outcomes.
First, in three of the four potential scenarios, the challenger can profit, while the proposer profits in only one. This is an intentional design by UMA, using the imbalance of risk and reward between the two parties to incentivize higher accuracy in proposed results. Since a challenger only needs to point out one flaw to win, the proposer must provide a result that is as accurate and compliant with standards as possible.
The second point is that UMA’s governance voting power holds absolute authority over the final result. In other words, the multi-billion-dollar prediction market spectacle built by Polymarket is, at its core, supported by a protocol with a fully diluted valuation of only around $100 million.
Exploring the Gray Areas
Combining the analysis of Polymarket’s resolution process above with a review of historical real dispute cases, it’s not difficult to see that there are certain gray areas in both the rule-setting/supplementary explanation phase during market operation and the final resolution process that can lead to controversy.
First, regarding the rule-setting and supplementary explanation phase, the essence of its ambiguity lies both in the fact that written rules sometimes cannot cover real-world variables and in the fact that the same textual description can often be interpreted in different ways. For example, in last year’s “Did Zelenskyy Wear a Suit?” incident, the rules did not explicitly state whether “military-style suits count as suits.” While Polymarket clarified in its supplementary explanation that “reliable reporting has not confirmed whether Zelenskyy wore a suit,” it did not define what constitutes “reliable reporting.” Such ambiguities inevitably lead to disputes.
If Polymarket, as the platform operator, could maintain neutrality, it might not provoke public anger every time, but the situation is hardly ideal. Polymarket’s operating entity is based in the United States, which means the regulatory environment and political context it faces make it difficult to remain completely neutral on all geopolitical issues. For instance, in the current “Will the U.S. invade Venezuela?” matter, when it involves U.S. military or diplomatic actions itself, rule interpretations tend to lean towards more conservative, “non-militarized” language. This is understandable, but ultimately, it’s the users who suffer the losses.
As for the resolution process, the source of ambiguity points directly to the potential for manipulation in UMA voting. Although UMA designed a reward/punishment game mechanism to constrain proposal behavior and improve result accuracy, this mechanism only constrains economic interests within its system. When external profit opportunities exist, theoretical room for malicious action remains. This is not unfounded suspicion. In last year’s “Ukrainian Rare Earth” incident, a UMA whale manipulated voting power to forcibly reverse the outcome, resulting in $7 million worth of bets being settled incorrectly.
The existence of these gray areas is the root cause of frequent accusations that Polymarket is unfair and represents a structural issue prediction markets need to address. In fact, any prediction market involving complex real-world events inevitably faces a triple dilemma: First, real-world events themselves often cannot be clearly binarized; geopolitics, military actions, and diplomatic games are inherently full of gray areas. Second, rules must be expressed in language, but language naturally allows for interpretive space. Third, once a resolution mechanism introduces human or governance participation, it inevitably becomes subject to interest-based博弈.
From a user’s perspective, perhaps you need to realize early on — in prediction markets, what you are betting on is not “what will happen in the world,” but “how the rules will ultimately be interpreted.”
Original link
〈Who Defines “Facts”? The Truth of Power and the Space for Malice in Polymarket’s Resolution Mechanism〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
翻訳
Predictive Markets Stir Up the Trillion-Dollar Gambling Industry, Facing Pursuit from the Old Order
Tennessee orders Kalshi, Polymarket and Crypto.com to cease prediction market sports betting services, claiming unlicensed gambling operations and exposing conflict between state law and event contracts.
Prediction markets bypass state licensing by classifying event contracts as financial derivatives, fueling rapid growth but eroding traditional sports betting tax revenue and drawing regulatory fire.
Several states have pursued legal action; Kalshi’s federal lawsuits highlight unresolved regulatory contradictions and potentially set precedents affecting the future of predictive platforms.
Prediction markets face intense state regulatory push as U.S. states crack down on event contracts, alleging illegal sports betting and threatening industry growth.
he thriving prediction market is now facing a real challenge.
On January 9th, US local time, the Tennessee Sports Wagering Council (SWC) issued cease-and-desist orders to prediction market platforms including Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com, demanding these platforms stop offering sports event prediction contracts to residents of the state. The reason cited is that these companies are engaging in illegal gambling operations without obtaining state licenses.
In the notification letters, the SWC accused the three companies of illegally offering sports betting products under the guise of “event contracts.” Although these platforms are registered with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as designated contract markets, according to Tennessee law, any entity offering sports event betting services within the state must hold a license issued by the SWC.
The SWC demanded that Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com cease all activities in the state, close open contracts, and refund resident deposits by January 31st. Failure to comply may result in civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation and even potential criminal charges.
The Rapidly Growing Sports Betting Market
To understand why Tennessee is taking such a hard stance against prediction market platforms, we need to start with the current state of the US sports betting market.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the federal law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which had prohibited commercial sports betting, on May 14, 2018, individual states have gained the authority to decide whether to legalize sports betting within their jurisdictions. Currently, sports betting in the US is regulated by state-level agencies responsible for licensing, compliance, and enforcement, with each state setting its own tax regime, market entry barriers, and responsible gambling requirements.
According to reports from the sports betting media Legal Sports Report, as of now, 38 US states (including Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico) have legalized sports betting services (both online and retail), with 30 states allowing online sports betting services — Tennessee is one of them and is the first state to allow only online sports betting while prohibiting physical betting venues.
Home to popular leagues like the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, the US is undoubtedly a sports powerhouse, and sports betting is a gambling service clearly defined and heavily taxed by state governments.
Statistics from another major sports betting media outlet, Sports Book Review (see chart below, data as of August 2025), show that since the regulatory opening in 2018, the total betting handle and tax revenue of the US sports betting market have experienced remarkable growth over the past few years — in 2024, the total market handle reached $148.74 billion, contributing $2.82 billion in taxes; in just the first eight months of 2025, the total handle ($121.22 billion) and tax revenue ($2.68 billion) have already approached the full-year 2024 levels.
Focus on Tennessee: What Does Sports Betting Mean?
Now, let’s focus on Tennessee, the protagonist of this incident.
In 2019, Tennessee passed the Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, formally legalizing sports betting. Although then-Governor Bill Lee had reservations about gambling, he allowed the bill to pass without exercising his veto power. Between 2021 and 2022, the Tennessee General Assembly passed laws establishing a dedicated regulatory council to oversee licensing and regulation. This council was initially called the Sports Wagering Advisory Council and later renamed the Tennessee Sports Wagering Council (SWC), the same body that issued the cease-and-desist orders to Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com.
Currently, the SWC is Tennessee’s sole sports betting regulator, responsible for operational licensing, compliance oversight, rule-making, and enforcement. The SWC stipulates that all sports betting providers must obtain an SWC license to offer services in the state. To date, a total of 11 licenses have been issued (see chart above); only residents aged 21 and over can access related services and must pass geolocation verification to ensure bets are placed within the state. Regarding taxation, the state levies a 1.85% tax on the total handle — initially, a revenue-based tax scheme was used, but this was changed to a handle-based tax after 2023.
The sports betting market contributes significant tax revenue to Tennessee. Statistics from Sports Book Review (see chart below, data as of July 2025) show that in 2024, Tennessee’s sports betting market handle reached $5.268 billion, contributing $97.16 million in taxes. In the first seven months of 2025, the handle has already reached $2.4 billion, with tax contributions amounting to $56.4 million.
However, this massive and still-growing pie is now being gradually eroded by platforms like Polymarket.
How Are Prediction Markets Eroding the Old World?
On December 3, 2025, Polymarket announced it had received CFTC approval to return to the US market after nearly four years. Even earlier, Kalshi and Crypto.com’s prediction market platform, Truth Predict, had already opened their doors to US users under CFTC approval.
The current regulatory landscape is that sports betting is clearly classified as a gambling service, regulated by individual states. However, prediction market platforms like Polymarket are generally viewed as new entities offering “event contract” trading services. “Event contracts” are considered financial derivatives in terms of asset nature, falling under the CFTC’s regulatory purview. This allows prediction markets to bypass the stringent regulations governing gambling services — they don’t need state licenses, don’t have to follow user protection rules like addiction controls, and don’t pay high gambling taxes to states. Yet, they can offer services similar to betting on sports event outcomes, objectively creating a form of “regulatory arbitrage.”
If prediction markets remained small-scale experiments, it might be tolerable. But the reality is that the growth rate of prediction markets is even more staggering than the already impressive growth of the sports betting market — in 2025, the total trading volume of prediction markets was approximately $40 billion, a roughly 400% increase from $9 billion in 2024. Data Dashboards‘ data dashboard compiled on Dune (see chart below) shows that sports-related event contracts have long become the category with the highest trading volume share in prediction markets.
The capital markets have already sensed the growing threat Polymarket poses to traditional sports betting services. Two giants of the sports betting market, DraftKings and Flutter Entertainment, recorded declines of 11.7% and 16.1% respectively over the past year — during the same period, the US stock market was in a bull run, with the Dow Jones up 12.97%, the Nasdaq up 20.36%, and the S&P 500 up 16.39% for the year; meanwhile, the sports betting market size continued its eight-year upward trend.
Whether it’s Tennessee, which relies on sports betting as a tax revenue source, or the capital forces that effectively control the sports betting market, it’s difficult for them to agree to let this new player, the prediction market, take a slice of the pie.
Friction Is Not Isolated: How Are Prediction Markets Fighting Back?
In fact, Tennessee’s ban on prediction markets is not an isolated incident. States including Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada, Montana, Michigan, and Connecticut have all cracked down on prediction markets for similar reasons. Since Polymarket only returned to the US market in December last year, Kalshi has borne the brunt of more regulatory pressure.
In response, Kalshi has filed lawsuits against three states — Nevada, New Jersey, and Maryland — arguing that it “complies with higher-priority federal regulations and therefore does not need to comply with state-level regulations.” However, the results have not been ideal.
The lawsuit in Nevada progressed first. The district court initially sided with Kalshi but later, in November last year, ruled against Kalshi. Judge Andrew Gordon determined that sports-related event contracts on Kalshi were very similar to sports betting wagers and thus fell under Nevada’s gambling regulations. Kalshi has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In New Jersey, the district court sided with Kalshi, but the state’s gambling regulator has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
In Maryland, the district court sided with the gambling regulator’s request. Judge Adam B. ruled that Kalshi failed to prove “Congress has clearly and manifestly intended to deprive states of the power to regulate gambling.” Kalshi has appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The law firm Benesch commented on this, stating that as the nationwide debate continues, similar divisions are expected at the appellate court level, setting the stage for the Supreme Court to resolve this issue in the coming years… If appellate courts happen to consistently support Kalshi’s position, other prediction markets might emulate its model and proceed with similar businesses before the Supreme Court hears the matter. However, if appellate courts reach different conclusions, companies in similar situations might wait for clearer legal signals before acting. Regardless, Kalshi’s lawsuits will create a precedent with direct and profound implications for the national sports betting and gambling industry.
In summary, the question of whether prediction markets need to follow state gambling regulations remains unresolved for now. The fundamental conflict lies in the similarity of the products/services offered by prediction markets and sports betting, contrasted with the differences in their regulatory requirements.
This is a tug-of-war over regulatory fit. Until appellate courts or even the Supreme Court provide a final ruling, the gray area between prediction markets and sports betting will persist, and regulatory conflicts will be hard to avoid. In the short term, states will likely continue to defend their regulatory authority and tax base through enforcement and litigation. Meanwhile, prediction market platforms will attempt to use federal compliance and innovation narratives as shields to fight for greater survival space.
Original link
〈Predictive Markets Stir Up the Trillion-Dollar Gambling Industry, Facing Pursuit from the Old Order〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
Prediction markets bypass state licensing by classifying event contracts as financial derivatives, fueling rapid growth but eroding traditional sports betting tax revenue and drawing regulatory fire.
Several states have pursued legal action; Kalshi’s federal lawsuits highlight unresolved regulatory contradictions and potentially set precedents affecting the future of predictive platforms.
Prediction markets face intense state regulatory push as U.S. states crack down on event contracts, alleging illegal sports betting and threatening industry growth.
he thriving prediction market is now facing a real challenge.
On January 9th, US local time, the Tennessee Sports Wagering Council (SWC) issued cease-and-desist orders to prediction market platforms including Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com, demanding these platforms stop offering sports event prediction contracts to residents of the state. The reason cited is that these companies are engaging in illegal gambling operations without obtaining state licenses.
In the notification letters, the SWC accused the three companies of illegally offering sports betting products under the guise of “event contracts.” Although these platforms are registered with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as designated contract markets, according to Tennessee law, any entity offering sports event betting services within the state must hold a license issued by the SWC.
The SWC demanded that Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com cease all activities in the state, close open contracts, and refund resident deposits by January 31st. Failure to comply may result in civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation and even potential criminal charges.
The Rapidly Growing Sports Betting Market
To understand why Tennessee is taking such a hard stance against prediction market platforms, we need to start with the current state of the US sports betting market.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the federal law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which had prohibited commercial sports betting, on May 14, 2018, individual states have gained the authority to decide whether to legalize sports betting within their jurisdictions. Currently, sports betting in the US is regulated by state-level agencies responsible for licensing, compliance, and enforcement, with each state setting its own tax regime, market entry barriers, and responsible gambling requirements.
According to reports from the sports betting media Legal Sports Report, as of now, 38 US states (including Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico) have legalized sports betting services (both online and retail), with 30 states allowing online sports betting services — Tennessee is one of them and is the first state to allow only online sports betting while prohibiting physical betting venues.
Home to popular leagues like the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, the US is undoubtedly a sports powerhouse, and sports betting is a gambling service clearly defined and heavily taxed by state governments.
Statistics from another major sports betting media outlet, Sports Book Review (see chart below, data as of August 2025), show that since the regulatory opening in 2018, the total betting handle and tax revenue of the US sports betting market have experienced remarkable growth over the past few years — in 2024, the total market handle reached $148.74 billion, contributing $2.82 billion in taxes; in just the first eight months of 2025, the total handle ($121.22 billion) and tax revenue ($2.68 billion) have already approached the full-year 2024 levels.
Focus on Tennessee: What Does Sports Betting Mean?
Now, let’s focus on Tennessee, the protagonist of this incident.
In 2019, Tennessee passed the Tennessee Sports Gaming Act, formally legalizing sports betting. Although then-Governor Bill Lee had reservations about gambling, he allowed the bill to pass without exercising his veto power. Between 2021 and 2022, the Tennessee General Assembly passed laws establishing a dedicated regulatory council to oversee licensing and regulation. This council was initially called the Sports Wagering Advisory Council and later renamed the Tennessee Sports Wagering Council (SWC), the same body that issued the cease-and-desist orders to Kalshi, Polymarket, and Crypto.com.
Currently, the SWC is Tennessee’s sole sports betting regulator, responsible for operational licensing, compliance oversight, rule-making, and enforcement. The SWC stipulates that all sports betting providers must obtain an SWC license to offer services in the state. To date, a total of 11 licenses have been issued (see chart above); only residents aged 21 and over can access related services and must pass geolocation verification to ensure bets are placed within the state. Regarding taxation, the state levies a 1.85% tax on the total handle — initially, a revenue-based tax scheme was used, but this was changed to a handle-based tax after 2023.
The sports betting market contributes significant tax revenue to Tennessee. Statistics from Sports Book Review (see chart below, data as of July 2025) show that in 2024, Tennessee’s sports betting market handle reached $5.268 billion, contributing $97.16 million in taxes. In the first seven months of 2025, the handle has already reached $2.4 billion, with tax contributions amounting to $56.4 million.
However, this massive and still-growing pie is now being gradually eroded by platforms like Polymarket.
How Are Prediction Markets Eroding the Old World?
On December 3, 2025, Polymarket announced it had received CFTC approval to return to the US market after nearly four years. Even earlier, Kalshi and Crypto.com’s prediction market platform, Truth Predict, had already opened their doors to US users under CFTC approval.
The current regulatory landscape is that sports betting is clearly classified as a gambling service, regulated by individual states. However, prediction market platforms like Polymarket are generally viewed as new entities offering “event contract” trading services. “Event contracts” are considered financial derivatives in terms of asset nature, falling under the CFTC’s regulatory purview. This allows prediction markets to bypass the stringent regulations governing gambling services — they don’t need state licenses, don’t have to follow user protection rules like addiction controls, and don’t pay high gambling taxes to states. Yet, they can offer services similar to betting on sports event outcomes, objectively creating a form of “regulatory arbitrage.”
If prediction markets remained small-scale experiments, it might be tolerable. But the reality is that the growth rate of prediction markets is even more staggering than the already impressive growth of the sports betting market — in 2025, the total trading volume of prediction markets was approximately $40 billion, a roughly 400% increase from $9 billion in 2024. Data Dashboards‘ data dashboard compiled on Dune (see chart below) shows that sports-related event contracts have long become the category with the highest trading volume share in prediction markets.
The capital markets have already sensed the growing threat Polymarket poses to traditional sports betting services. Two giants of the sports betting market, DraftKings and Flutter Entertainment, recorded declines of 11.7% and 16.1% respectively over the past year — during the same period, the US stock market was in a bull run, with the Dow Jones up 12.97%, the Nasdaq up 20.36%, and the S&P 500 up 16.39% for the year; meanwhile, the sports betting market size continued its eight-year upward trend.
Whether it’s Tennessee, which relies on sports betting as a tax revenue source, or the capital forces that effectively control the sports betting market, it’s difficult for them to agree to let this new player, the prediction market, take a slice of the pie.
Friction Is Not Isolated: How Are Prediction Markets Fighting Back?
In fact, Tennessee’s ban on prediction markets is not an isolated incident. States including Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada, Montana, Michigan, and Connecticut have all cracked down on prediction markets for similar reasons. Since Polymarket only returned to the US market in December last year, Kalshi has borne the brunt of more regulatory pressure.
In response, Kalshi has filed lawsuits against three states — Nevada, New Jersey, and Maryland — arguing that it “complies with higher-priority federal regulations and therefore does not need to comply with state-level regulations.” However, the results have not been ideal.
The lawsuit in Nevada progressed first. The district court initially sided with Kalshi but later, in November last year, ruled against Kalshi. Judge Andrew Gordon determined that sports-related event contracts on Kalshi were very similar to sports betting wagers and thus fell under Nevada’s gambling regulations. Kalshi has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In New Jersey, the district court sided with Kalshi, but the state’s gambling regulator has appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
In Maryland, the district court sided with the gambling regulator’s request. Judge Adam B. ruled that Kalshi failed to prove “Congress has clearly and manifestly intended to deprive states of the power to regulate gambling.” Kalshi has appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The law firm Benesch commented on this, stating that as the nationwide debate continues, similar divisions are expected at the appellate court level, setting the stage for the Supreme Court to resolve this issue in the coming years… If appellate courts happen to consistently support Kalshi’s position, other prediction markets might emulate its model and proceed with similar businesses before the Supreme Court hears the matter. However, if appellate courts reach different conclusions, companies in similar situations might wait for clearer legal signals before acting. Regardless, Kalshi’s lawsuits will create a precedent with direct and profound implications for the national sports betting and gambling industry.
In summary, the question of whether prediction markets need to follow state gambling regulations remains unresolved for now. The fundamental conflict lies in the similarity of the products/services offered by prediction markets and sports betting, contrasted with the differences in their regulatory requirements.
This is a tug-of-war over regulatory fit. Until appellate courts or even the Supreme Court provide a final ruling, the gray area between prediction markets and sports betting will persist, and regulatory conflicts will be hard to avoid. In the short term, states will likely continue to defend their regulatory authority and tax base through enforcement and litigation. Meanwhile, prediction market platforms will attempt to use federal compliance and innovation narratives as shields to fight for greater survival space.
Original link
〈Predictive Markets Stir Up the Trillion-Dollar Gambling Industry, Facing Pursuit from the Old Order〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
原文参照
マイクロストラテジーのビットコインレバレッジ：法定通貨の劣化へのマクロベット
マイクロストラテジーのビットコイン露出は、長期で低金利の転換可能債務によって資金調達されており、マージンコールリスクを排除し、ボラティリティを吸収する時間を得られる。
この戦略は本質的に、通貨の劣化に対するマクロベットであり、価値が低下する法定通貨負債を使って、供給量が固定されたデジタル資産を蓄積するものである。
時計仕掛けの爆弾ではなく、マイクロストラテジーは上昇の非対称性と制御された下落リスクを持つレバレッジ付きビットコインコールオプションとして機能している。
Convertible debt、通貨の劣化、そしてMSTRが長期的なビットコインコールオプションとして機能する理由を検討する、マイクロストラテジーのビットコインレバレッジ戦略の詳細な分析。
この戦略は本質的に、通貨の劣化に対するマクロベットであり、価値が低下する法定通貨負債を使って、供給量が固定されたデジタル資産を蓄積するものである。
時計仕掛けの爆弾ではなく、マイクロストラテジーは上昇の非対称性と制御された下落リスクを持つレバレッジ付きビットコインコールオプションとして機能している。
Convertible debt、通貨の劣化、そしてMSTRが長期的なビットコインコールオプションとして機能する理由を検討する、マイクロストラテジーのビットコインレバレッジ戦略の詳細な分析。
翻訳
🎬SEC Chair Atkins: it’s still unclear whether the U.S. will seize Venezuela’s estimated $60B+ in Bitcoin holdings.
#CoinRank #Bitcoin #Venezuela
#CoinRank #Bitcoin #Venezuela
翻訳
What Is a Prediction Market: How Markets Turn Uncertainty Into Usable Knowledge
What is a prediction market is best understood as a mechanism that converts dispersed beliefs into real time probability through financial incentives, often producing more accurate forecasts than polls or expert consensus.
Crypto native platforms like Polymarket have transformed prediction markets from academic experiments into public information infrastructure by enabling global participation, transparent settlement, and continuous price discovery.
While prediction markets are powerful tools for aggregating knowledge, they introduce new challenges around regulation, ethical boundaries, oracle design, and feedback loops that must be carefully managed as adoption grows.
What is a prediction market has become one of the most searched questions in crypto and financial circles over the past two years. Once treated as a niche concept discussed mainly by economists and political scientists, prediction markets have moved into the mainstream conversation. Traders reference them. Journalists cite them. Policymakers quietly monitor them. In moments of uncertainty, prediction markets are increasingly treated as a parallel source of truth.
At a surface level, a prediction market looks simple. People trade contracts tied to future events, and prices reflect perceived probabilities. But this simplicity is deceptive. Behind each price sits a complex system of incentives, information flows, and behavioral dynamics. Unlike polls or expert panels, prediction markets do not ask participants to explain their reasoning. They ask them to commit capital. That single requirement fundamentally changes how information is revealed.
The growing relevance of prediction markets is not accidental. Traditional forecasting tools are struggling. Opinion polls suffer from selection bias and declining response rates. Expert forecasts often lag reality and cluster around consensus views. Statistical models depend on assumptions that break down during regime shifts. Against this backdrop, the question of what is a prediction market matters because it points to a different way of producing knowledge. It replaces authority with accountability and opinion with probability.
Understanding prediction markets today requires more than a definition. It requires examining why they exist, how they function at a micro level, why crypto native platforms like Polymarket changed their trajectory, and what risks emerge when markets begin to shape the very realities they attempt to predict.
WHAT IS A PREDICTION MARKET AND WHY IT EXISTS
Markets as decentralized information processors
To understand what is a prediction market, it is necessary to start with a broader insight about markets themselves. Markets are not merely mechanisms for buying and selling goods. They are decentralized systems for processing information. Prices encode expectations about the future based on the collective actions of individuals responding to local signals.
This idea is most closely associated with Friedrich Hayek, who argued that no central planner can ever possess the full range of knowledge dispersed across society. Information about the world is fragmented, contextual, and often tacit. Markets solve this problem not by collecting information, but by allowing people to act on what they know. Prices emerge as summaries of these actions.
Prediction markets take this logic and apply it directly to uncertainty about future events. Instead of inferring expectations indirectly through asset prices or surveys, prediction markets explicitly ask participants to trade on outcomes. The market price becomes a probability estimate derived from economic behavior rather than verbal claims.
What is a prediction market in operational terms
Operationally, a prediction market consists of contracts tied to specific, verifiable outcomes. These outcomes may be binary, such as whether a candidate wins an election, or scalar, such as the level of inflation at a given date. Each contract pays out a fixed amount if the outcome occurs and nothing if it does not.
Participants buy and sell these contracts based on their beliefs and information. If they believe an outcome is underpriced, they buy. If they believe it is overpriced, they sell. The resulting price reflects the balance of informed conviction in the market.
This structure transforms belief into a measurable quantity. Asking what is a prediction market is therefore asking how belief becomes constrained by cost. The market does not reward confidence alone. It rewards accuracy over time.
HOW PREDICTION MARKETS TURN BELIEF INTO PROBABILITY
Incentives filter noise better than opinion
The defining feature of prediction markets is incentive alignment. In polls, respondents face no cost for being wrong. In expert panels, reputational incentives often encourage caution and conformity. Prediction markets are different. Participants must put money at risk.
This requirement filters noise aggressively. Traders with weak information or low confidence participate less. Those with strong signals and conviction trade more heavily. Over time, inaccurate traders lose capital and influence, while accurate ones gain it. The market evolves toward better calibration not through debate, but through selection.
This is why prediction markets often outperform traditional forecasting methods. They do not assume equal credibility. They allow credibility to be earned and lost through economic consequences.
What is a prediction market pricing mechanism
Modern prediction markets rely on mechanisms that ensure continuous pricing even when participation is limited. Early markets used traditional order books, matching buyers and sellers directly. However, many contemporary platforms employ automated market makers that adjust prices algorithmically based on order flow.
These systems ensure that traders can always transact, while making it increasingly expensive to push prices toward extremes. Small trades move prices slightly. Large moves require disproportionate capital. This structure discourages casual manipulation and forces conviction to be expressed through sustained risk taking.
Understanding what is a prediction market therefore involves understanding how cost curves, liquidity parameters, and market design shape probability formation.
POLYMARKET AND THE RISE OF CRYPTO NATIVE PREDICTION MARKETS
What Polymarket changed about scale and visibility
The emergence of Polymarket marked a decisive shift in the prediction market landscape. Earlier platforms existed, but they struggled with liquidity, user experience, and regulatory constraints. Polymarket combined crypto infrastructure with consumer grade design, dramatically lowering the barrier to participation.
Built on blockchain settlement, Polymarket enabled global access, transparent resolution, and rapid market creation. Users did not need traditional brokerage accounts. They needed a wallet. This design unlocked massive participation during high interest events such as elections and geopolitical crises.
As trading volume grew, Polymarket prices began appearing in mainstream media. Journalists referenced them alongside polls. Analysts compared them to expert forecasts. Campaigns quietly monitored them for momentum signals. In practice, Polymarket turned prediction markets from niche tools into public indicators.
This shift redefined what is a prediction market in the public imagination. It was no longer an experiment. It was infrastructure.
Crypto infrastructure and the oracle problem
Crypto native prediction markets introduced new advantages, but also new risks. Settlement transparency reduced trust requirements, but outcome resolution became a central challenge. Markets are only useful if outcomes are resolved credibly.
This led to the development of oracle systems that combine economic incentives with dispute resolution. Instead of relying on a single authority, decentralized oracles rely on token based incentives to align truth telling. Incorrect resolutions can be challenged at a cost, while honest reporting becomes the equilibrium strategy.
Understanding what is a prediction market in the crypto era therefore requires recognizing that it is not just a trading venue. It is a system for producing truth under adversarial conditions.
REAL WORLD USE CASES AND INFORMATIONAL POWER
Elections macro data and real time sentiment
Elections brought prediction markets into the spotlight because outcomes are binary and publicly verifiable. But their utility extends far beyond politics. Markets now exist for inflation releases, interest rate decisions, court rulings, regulatory approvals, and even corporate actions.
Each market acts as a sensor. Individually, these signals may seem narrow. Collectively, they form a probabilistic map of expectations across domains. Analysts increasingly treat prediction market prices as alternative data inputs rather than curiosities.
What is a prediction market revealing that experts miss
Experts often face asymmetric incentives. Being wrong publicly carries reputational risk. As a result, forecasts tend to cluster around consensus views. Prediction markets do not punish dissent. They reward it when it is correct.
This allows markets to surface minority views early. When informed traders disagree with prevailing narratives, prices move before consensus shifts. This early warning function is one of the most underappreciated aspects of prediction markets.
Understanding what is a prediction market means recognizing that it captures disagreement quantitatively, not rhetorically.
LIMITATIONS REGULATION AND STRUCTURAL RISKS
Manipulation moral hazard and feedback loops
No prediction market is immune to risk. Short term manipulation is possible, particularly in thin markets. However, sustained manipulation is costly. Traders with better information profit by correcting mispricing, restoring prices toward reality.
More concerning are cases where participants can influence outcomes directly. When markets allow trading on events that participants can affect, moral hazard emerges. This is why careful market selection and restrictions are essential.
Another risk involves feedback loops. Market prices can influence behavior. High probability signals can shape decisions, making outcomes more likely. This self reinforcing dynamic requires careful interpretation.
What is a prediction market allowed to become
Regulatory frameworks remain fragmented. Some jurisdictions treat prediction markets as derivatives. Others classify them as gambling. Ethical concerns arise when markets involve harm, violence, or tragedy.
These debates are unresolved. They reflect broader questions about whether society is comfortable pricing all forms of uncertainty. Understanding what is a prediction market therefore includes understanding where society draws its boundaries.
A MARKET THAT PRICES UNCERTAINTY RATHER THAN AUTHORITY
What is a prediction market is ultimately a question about how societies choose to confront uncertainty. Prediction markets do not promise certainty or moral clarity. They offer something narrower and more powerful. A disciplined way to aggregate belief under risk.
By forcing opinions to bear economic consequences, prediction markets transform speculation into signal. They do not eliminate uncertainty. They measure it. In a world saturated with noise, that may be the most valuable function a market can perform.
〈What Is a Prediction Market: How Markets Turn Uncertainty Into Usable Knowledge〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
Crypto native platforms like Polymarket have transformed prediction markets from academic experiments into public information infrastructure by enabling global participation, transparent settlement, and continuous price discovery.
While prediction markets are powerful tools for aggregating knowledge, they introduce new challenges around regulation, ethical boundaries, oracle design, and feedback loops that must be carefully managed as adoption grows.
What is a prediction market has become one of the most searched questions in crypto and financial circles over the past two years. Once treated as a niche concept discussed mainly by economists and political scientists, prediction markets have moved into the mainstream conversation. Traders reference them. Journalists cite them. Policymakers quietly monitor them. In moments of uncertainty, prediction markets are increasingly treated as a parallel source of truth.
At a surface level, a prediction market looks simple. People trade contracts tied to future events, and prices reflect perceived probabilities. But this simplicity is deceptive. Behind each price sits a complex system of incentives, information flows, and behavioral dynamics. Unlike polls or expert panels, prediction markets do not ask participants to explain their reasoning. They ask them to commit capital. That single requirement fundamentally changes how information is revealed.
The growing relevance of prediction markets is not accidental. Traditional forecasting tools are struggling. Opinion polls suffer from selection bias and declining response rates. Expert forecasts often lag reality and cluster around consensus views. Statistical models depend on assumptions that break down during regime shifts. Against this backdrop, the question of what is a prediction market matters because it points to a different way of producing knowledge. It replaces authority with accountability and opinion with probability.
Understanding prediction markets today requires more than a definition. It requires examining why they exist, how they function at a micro level, why crypto native platforms like Polymarket changed their trajectory, and what risks emerge when markets begin to shape the very realities they attempt to predict.
WHAT IS A PREDICTION MARKET AND WHY IT EXISTS
Markets as decentralized information processors
To understand what is a prediction market, it is necessary to start with a broader insight about markets themselves. Markets are not merely mechanisms for buying and selling goods. They are decentralized systems for processing information. Prices encode expectations about the future based on the collective actions of individuals responding to local signals.
This idea is most closely associated with Friedrich Hayek, who argued that no central planner can ever possess the full range of knowledge dispersed across society. Information about the world is fragmented, contextual, and often tacit. Markets solve this problem not by collecting information, but by allowing people to act on what they know. Prices emerge as summaries of these actions.
Prediction markets take this logic and apply it directly to uncertainty about future events. Instead of inferring expectations indirectly through asset prices or surveys, prediction markets explicitly ask participants to trade on outcomes. The market price becomes a probability estimate derived from economic behavior rather than verbal claims.
What is a prediction market in operational terms
Operationally, a prediction market consists of contracts tied to specific, verifiable outcomes. These outcomes may be binary, such as whether a candidate wins an election, or scalar, such as the level of inflation at a given date. Each contract pays out a fixed amount if the outcome occurs and nothing if it does not.
Participants buy and sell these contracts based on their beliefs and information. If they believe an outcome is underpriced, they buy. If they believe it is overpriced, they sell. The resulting price reflects the balance of informed conviction in the market.
This structure transforms belief into a measurable quantity. Asking what is a prediction market is therefore asking how belief becomes constrained by cost. The market does not reward confidence alone. It rewards accuracy over time.
HOW PREDICTION MARKETS TURN BELIEF INTO PROBABILITY
Incentives filter noise better than opinion
The defining feature of prediction markets is incentive alignment. In polls, respondents face no cost for being wrong. In expert panels, reputational incentives often encourage caution and conformity. Prediction markets are different. Participants must put money at risk.
This requirement filters noise aggressively. Traders with weak information or low confidence participate less. Those with strong signals and conviction trade more heavily. Over time, inaccurate traders lose capital and influence, while accurate ones gain it. The market evolves toward better calibration not through debate, but through selection.
This is why prediction markets often outperform traditional forecasting methods. They do not assume equal credibility. They allow credibility to be earned and lost through economic consequences.
What is a prediction market pricing mechanism
Modern prediction markets rely on mechanisms that ensure continuous pricing even when participation is limited. Early markets used traditional order books, matching buyers and sellers directly. However, many contemporary platforms employ automated market makers that adjust prices algorithmically based on order flow.
These systems ensure that traders can always transact, while making it increasingly expensive to push prices toward extremes. Small trades move prices slightly. Large moves require disproportionate capital. This structure discourages casual manipulation and forces conviction to be expressed through sustained risk taking.
Understanding what is a prediction market therefore involves understanding how cost curves, liquidity parameters, and market design shape probability formation.
POLYMARKET AND THE RISE OF CRYPTO NATIVE PREDICTION MARKETS
What Polymarket changed about scale and visibility
The emergence of Polymarket marked a decisive shift in the prediction market landscape. Earlier platforms existed, but they struggled with liquidity, user experience, and regulatory constraints. Polymarket combined crypto infrastructure with consumer grade design, dramatically lowering the barrier to participation.
Built on blockchain settlement, Polymarket enabled global access, transparent resolution, and rapid market creation. Users did not need traditional brokerage accounts. They needed a wallet. This design unlocked massive participation during high interest events such as elections and geopolitical crises.
As trading volume grew, Polymarket prices began appearing in mainstream media. Journalists referenced them alongside polls. Analysts compared them to expert forecasts. Campaigns quietly monitored them for momentum signals. In practice, Polymarket turned prediction markets from niche tools into public indicators.
This shift redefined what is a prediction market in the public imagination. It was no longer an experiment. It was infrastructure.
Crypto infrastructure and the oracle problem
Crypto native prediction markets introduced new advantages, but also new risks. Settlement transparency reduced trust requirements, but outcome resolution became a central challenge. Markets are only useful if outcomes are resolved credibly.
This led to the development of oracle systems that combine economic incentives with dispute resolution. Instead of relying on a single authority, decentralized oracles rely on token based incentives to align truth telling. Incorrect resolutions can be challenged at a cost, while honest reporting becomes the equilibrium strategy.
Understanding what is a prediction market in the crypto era therefore requires recognizing that it is not just a trading venue. It is a system for producing truth under adversarial conditions.
REAL WORLD USE CASES AND INFORMATIONAL POWER
Elections macro data and real time sentiment
Elections brought prediction markets into the spotlight because outcomes are binary and publicly verifiable. But their utility extends far beyond politics. Markets now exist for inflation releases, interest rate decisions, court rulings, regulatory approvals, and even corporate actions.
Each market acts as a sensor. Individually, these signals may seem narrow. Collectively, they form a probabilistic map of expectations across domains. Analysts increasingly treat prediction market prices as alternative data inputs rather than curiosities.
What is a prediction market revealing that experts miss
Experts often face asymmetric incentives. Being wrong publicly carries reputational risk. As a result, forecasts tend to cluster around consensus views. Prediction markets do not punish dissent. They reward it when it is correct.
This allows markets to surface minority views early. When informed traders disagree with prevailing narratives, prices move before consensus shifts. This early warning function is one of the most underappreciated aspects of prediction markets.
Understanding what is a prediction market means recognizing that it captures disagreement quantitatively, not rhetorically.
LIMITATIONS REGULATION AND STRUCTURAL RISKS
Manipulation moral hazard and feedback loops
No prediction market is immune to risk. Short term manipulation is possible, particularly in thin markets. However, sustained manipulation is costly. Traders with better information profit by correcting mispricing, restoring prices toward reality.
More concerning are cases where participants can influence outcomes directly. When markets allow trading on events that participants can affect, moral hazard emerges. This is why careful market selection and restrictions are essential.
Another risk involves feedback loops. Market prices can influence behavior. High probability signals can shape decisions, making outcomes more likely. This self reinforcing dynamic requires careful interpretation.
What is a prediction market allowed to become
Regulatory frameworks remain fragmented. Some jurisdictions treat prediction markets as derivatives. Others classify them as gambling. Ethical concerns arise when markets involve harm, violence, or tragedy.
These debates are unresolved. They reflect broader questions about whether society is comfortable pricing all forms of uncertainty. Understanding what is a prediction market therefore includes understanding where society draws its boundaries.
A MARKET THAT PRICES UNCERTAINTY RATHER THAN AUTHORITY
What is a prediction market is ultimately a question about how societies choose to confront uncertainty. Prediction markets do not promise certainty or moral clarity. They offer something narrower and more powerful. A disciplined way to aggregate belief under risk.
By forcing opinions to bear economic consequences, prediction markets transform speculation into signal. They do not eliminate uncertainty. They measure it. In a world saturated with noise, that may be the most valuable function a market can perform.
〈What Is a Prediction Market: How Markets Turn Uncertainty Into Usable Knowledge〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
翻訳
DATA: CRYPTO SPOT TRADING VOLUME REACHED $18.6T IN 2025, PERPETUALS HIT $61.7T
CryptoQuant @cryptoquant_com 2025 exchange activity review shows that spot trading volume reached $18.6 trillion (+9% YoY), while perpetual futures volume surged to $61.7 trillion (+29% YoY).
#Binance remained dominant in spot trading, #Bitcoin perpetuals, liquidity, and reserves. Growth was primarily driven by derivatives, with market power continuing to concentrate among top exchanges.
#Crypto #CryptoMarket
CryptoQuant @cryptoquant_com 2025 exchange activity review shows that spot trading volume reached $18.6 trillion (+9% YoY), while perpetual futures volume surged to $61.7 trillion (+29% YoY).
#Binance remained dominant in spot trading, #Bitcoin perpetuals, liquidity, and reserves. Growth was primarily driven by derivatives, with market power continuing to concentrate among top exchanges.
#Crypto #CryptoMarket
翻訳
Uniswap CCA Is Rewriting Arbitrum-Native Token Launches
Uniswap’s CCA mechanism replaces speed-driven token launches with continuous, auction-based price discovery, aiming to improve fairness and reduce MEV advantages.
Arbitrum-native platforms such as HuddlePad are adopting CCA as a default launch primitive, signaling a shift toward standardized, infrastructure-level issuance models.
The success of CCA will depend on post-launch liquidity depth and repeat adoption across projects, determining whether it becomes a lasting market standard or a one-off experiment.
Uniswap’s Continuous Clearing Auction (CCA) introduces a new standard for Arbitrum-native token launches by combining transparent price discovery with automatic liquidity formation onchain.
WHAT HAPPENED: CCA-STYLE LAUNCHES ARE MOVING FROM THEORY TO ARBITRUM EXECUTION
Uniswap has been rolling out Continuous Clearing Auctions (CCA) as part of its broader Liquidity Launchpad framework—an onchain mechanism designed to run fair price discovery auctions and then automatically seed a Uniswap v4 pool at the discovered clearing price.
In parallel, Arbitrum-native teams have begun positioning CCA as a “default” launch primitive for the ecosystem, with Huddle01 announcing HuddlePad as an Arbitrum-native launchpad built on Uniswap’s CCA engine, and Arbitrum’s official account publicly amplifying the same direction.
The significance is not that another launchpad exists, but that Arbitrum is converging on a mechanism design standard: instead of “first block wins” token launches, the market is experimenting with continuous auction clearing + liquidity bootstrapping as the baseline.
WHAT CCA ACTUALLY CHANGES: FROM SPEED GAMES TO MECHANISM DESIGN
Traditional token launches have a familiar failure mode: whoever has the best latency, MEV access, or execution tooling captures the best price, while everyone else buys into instant volatility and thin liquidity. CCA is explicitly trying to make that failure mode structurally harder.
In Uniswap’s own write-up and whitepaper framing, CCA combines uniform clearing logic with early participation incentives to smooth price discovery, and then converts auction outcomes into immediate onchain liquidity rather than leaving “day-one liquidity” to ad-hoc market making.
That design targets three pain points simultaneously:
PRICE DISCOVERY becomes a process (clearing over time), not a single chaotic moment.
LIQUIDITY FORMATION is built into the mechanism, rather than depending on incentives or discretionary market makers.
MANIPULATION SURFACE AREA is reduced because the “edge” shifts away from speed and toward transparent bidding.
If it works as intended, CCA pushes token launches closer to how mature markets are supposed to behave: a transparent price formation process followed by liquidity at the price that actually cleared.
WHY ARBITRUM IS A NATURAL HOST FOR THIS MODEL
Arbitrum’s core advantage is not just lower fees; it is that the ecosystem has accumulated deep DeFi-native liquidity and active trading behavior, which makes it viable to run auctions that need sustained participation rather than one-time hype.
In practice, a mechanism like CCA benefits from environments where (1) traders are already comfortable executing onchain, and (2) protocols can compose liquidity and settlement in the same venue. That is precisely what Uniswap is building toward with Liquidity Launchpad as a v4-native framework.
And the market context supports why Uniswap is the “default venue” for this experiment: DefiLlama’s live DEX leaderboard regularly places Uniswap among the top DEXs by 24h volume, and historical reporting has shown Uniswap leading monthly DEX volume in prior peaks.
HUDDLEPAD AS THE “ARBITRUM-NATIVE” WRAPPER AROUND CCA
HuddlePad’s positioning is straightforward: it is not presenting itself as a new launch mechanism invented from scratch; it is presenting itself as an Arbitrum-native distribution and UX layer around CCA—meaning the “innovation” is partly productization: making auctions easier for projects and community participants to run and join, while keeping the clearing logic onchain.
The key point for readers is: if Arbitrum-native projects begin launching with CCA by default, the ecosystem could see a structural change in what “a good launch” looks like—less about immediate price spikes, more about credible price discovery and robust initial liquidity.
THE DATA SIGNAL: EIGEN FLOW INTO UNISWAP V3 SHOWS MECHANISM-ADJACENT ATTENTION
Alongside the narrative, onchain monitors flagged a notable liquidity movement: 4,952,647.21 EIGEN transferred into a Uniswap v3 pool, reported via Arkham-tagged monitoring and relayed by Binance’s official news account.
Even if this flow is not directly “CCA capital,” it is consistent with a broader behavioral pattern: when new issuance and auction mechanisms gain mindshare, attention often shows up first as liquidity positioning in the most liquid onchain venues, especially Uniswap pools.
The important analytic caution is that a single flow is not proof of sustained adoption; it is a high-frequency attention proxy that often accompanies shifts in launch/issuance narratives.
WHAT TO WATCH NEXT: THREE CHECKS THAT SEPARATE A REAL SHIFT FROM A ONE-OFF TREND
AUCTION OUTCOMES VS. POST-LAUNCH VOLATILITY
If CCA clears smoothly but liquidity still collapses post-launch, then the “fair launch” claim is only partially solved. Uniswap’s framework is explicitly designed to tie auctions to durable liquidity, so post-launch depth is the real test.
PARTICIPATION QUALITY
CCA’s edge is supposed to be fairness through mechanism design; that only holds if participation is broad and not dominated by a small cluster of sophisticated bidders.
REPEATABILITY ON ARBITRUM
The decisive signal will be whether multiple Arbitrum-native projects adopt CCA-style launches, turning it into a norm rather than a novelty—exactly the shift Arbitrum’s own messaging implies it wants to enable.
BOTTOM LINE: CCA IS A BID TO “STANDARDIZE FAIRNESS” IN TOKEN ISSUANCE
Uniswap’s CCA is best understood as an attempt to turn token launches from a social event into market infrastructure: a process where price discovery and liquidity provisioning are mechanically linked, minimizing the speed-and-bot advantages that defined earlier generations of launches.
If Arbitrum-native platforms like HuddlePad can make this usable at scale, Arbitrum could become the first major L2 where “fair launch” is not a slogan but a default mechanism choice.
Read More：
Uniswap’s Continuous Clearing Auctions Are Reshaping Arbitrum-Native Token Launches
〈Uniswap CCA Is Rewriting Arbitrum-Native Token Launches〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
Arbitrum-native platforms such as HuddlePad are adopting CCA as a default launch primitive, signaling a shift toward standardized, infrastructure-level issuance models.
The success of CCA will depend on post-launch liquidity depth and repeat adoption across projects, determining whether it becomes a lasting market standard or a one-off experiment.
Uniswap’s Continuous Clearing Auction (CCA) introduces a new standard for Arbitrum-native token launches by combining transparent price discovery with automatic liquidity formation onchain.
WHAT HAPPENED: CCA-STYLE LAUNCHES ARE MOVING FROM THEORY TO ARBITRUM EXECUTION
Uniswap has been rolling out Continuous Clearing Auctions (CCA) as part of its broader Liquidity Launchpad framework—an onchain mechanism designed to run fair price discovery auctions and then automatically seed a Uniswap v4 pool at the discovered clearing price.
In parallel, Arbitrum-native teams have begun positioning CCA as a “default” launch primitive for the ecosystem, with Huddle01 announcing HuddlePad as an Arbitrum-native launchpad built on Uniswap’s CCA engine, and Arbitrum’s official account publicly amplifying the same direction.
The significance is not that another launchpad exists, but that Arbitrum is converging on a mechanism design standard: instead of “first block wins” token launches, the market is experimenting with continuous auction clearing + liquidity bootstrapping as the baseline.
WHAT CCA ACTUALLY CHANGES: FROM SPEED GAMES TO MECHANISM DESIGN
Traditional token launches have a familiar failure mode: whoever has the best latency, MEV access, or execution tooling captures the best price, while everyone else buys into instant volatility and thin liquidity. CCA is explicitly trying to make that failure mode structurally harder.
In Uniswap’s own write-up and whitepaper framing, CCA combines uniform clearing logic with early participation incentives to smooth price discovery, and then converts auction outcomes into immediate onchain liquidity rather than leaving “day-one liquidity” to ad-hoc market making.
That design targets three pain points simultaneously:
PRICE DISCOVERY becomes a process (clearing over time), not a single chaotic moment.
LIQUIDITY FORMATION is built into the mechanism, rather than depending on incentives or discretionary market makers.
MANIPULATION SURFACE AREA is reduced because the “edge” shifts away from speed and toward transparent bidding.
If it works as intended, CCA pushes token launches closer to how mature markets are supposed to behave: a transparent price formation process followed by liquidity at the price that actually cleared.
WHY ARBITRUM IS A NATURAL HOST FOR THIS MODEL
Arbitrum’s core advantage is not just lower fees; it is that the ecosystem has accumulated deep DeFi-native liquidity and active trading behavior, which makes it viable to run auctions that need sustained participation rather than one-time hype.
In practice, a mechanism like CCA benefits from environments where (1) traders are already comfortable executing onchain, and (2) protocols can compose liquidity and settlement in the same venue. That is precisely what Uniswap is building toward with Liquidity Launchpad as a v4-native framework.
And the market context supports why Uniswap is the “default venue” for this experiment: DefiLlama’s live DEX leaderboard regularly places Uniswap among the top DEXs by 24h volume, and historical reporting has shown Uniswap leading monthly DEX volume in prior peaks.
HUDDLEPAD AS THE “ARBITRUM-NATIVE” WRAPPER AROUND CCA
HuddlePad’s positioning is straightforward: it is not presenting itself as a new launch mechanism invented from scratch; it is presenting itself as an Arbitrum-native distribution and UX layer around CCA—meaning the “innovation” is partly productization: making auctions easier for projects and community participants to run and join, while keeping the clearing logic onchain.
The key point for readers is: if Arbitrum-native projects begin launching with CCA by default, the ecosystem could see a structural change in what “a good launch” looks like—less about immediate price spikes, more about credible price discovery and robust initial liquidity.
THE DATA SIGNAL: EIGEN FLOW INTO UNISWAP V3 SHOWS MECHANISM-ADJACENT ATTENTION
Alongside the narrative, onchain monitors flagged a notable liquidity movement: 4,952,647.21 EIGEN transferred into a Uniswap v3 pool, reported via Arkham-tagged monitoring and relayed by Binance’s official news account.
Even if this flow is not directly “CCA capital,” it is consistent with a broader behavioral pattern: when new issuance and auction mechanisms gain mindshare, attention often shows up first as liquidity positioning in the most liquid onchain venues, especially Uniswap pools.
The important analytic caution is that a single flow is not proof of sustained adoption; it is a high-frequency attention proxy that often accompanies shifts in launch/issuance narratives.
WHAT TO WATCH NEXT: THREE CHECKS THAT SEPARATE A REAL SHIFT FROM A ONE-OFF TREND
AUCTION OUTCOMES VS. POST-LAUNCH VOLATILITY
If CCA clears smoothly but liquidity still collapses post-launch, then the “fair launch” claim is only partially solved. Uniswap’s framework is explicitly designed to tie auctions to durable liquidity, so post-launch depth is the real test.
PARTICIPATION QUALITY
CCA’s edge is supposed to be fairness through mechanism design; that only holds if participation is broad and not dominated by a small cluster of sophisticated bidders.
REPEATABILITY ON ARBITRUM
The decisive signal will be whether multiple Arbitrum-native projects adopt CCA-style launches, turning it into a norm rather than a novelty—exactly the shift Arbitrum’s own messaging implies it wants to enable.
BOTTOM LINE: CCA IS A BID TO “STANDARDIZE FAIRNESS” IN TOKEN ISSUANCE
Uniswap’s CCA is best understood as an attempt to turn token launches from a social event into market infrastructure: a process where price discovery and liquidity provisioning are mechanically linked, minimizing the speed-and-bot advantages that defined earlier generations of launches.
If Arbitrum-native platforms like HuddlePad can make this usable at scale, Arbitrum could become the first major L2 where “fair launch” is not a slogan but a default mechanism choice.
Read More：
Uniswap’s Continuous Clearing Auctions Are Reshaping Arbitrum-Native Token Launches
〈Uniswap CCA Is Rewriting Arbitrum-Native Token Launches〉這篇文章最早發佈於《CoinRank》。
翻訳
📉 IRAN’S CURRENCY HAS COLLAPSED — AND BITCOIN IS EMERGING AS A LIFELINE 🇮🇷
The Iranian rial has plunged to record lows against the U.S. dollar, eroding savings and fueling protests as inflation surges.
With the national currency effectively worthless on the open market, some Iranians are increasingly looking to Bitcoin and crypto as alternatives to preserve value amid crisis and sanctions.
#Iran #Bitcoin #BTC
The Iranian rial has plunged to record lows against the U.S. dollar, eroding savings and fueling protests as inflation surges.
With the national currency effectively worthless on the open market, some Iranians are increasingly looking to Bitcoin and crypto as alternatives to preserve value amid crisis and sanctions.
#Iran #Bitcoin #BTC
原文参照
「IP-RWA」ナラティブが盛り上がるとIPが上昇：市場が本当に価格付けているのは何か
投資家が「IP-RWA」のナラティブへとシフトしたことで、IPは高取引量で上昇した。知的財産を単なる投機的なトークンではなく、プログラマブルでオンチェーンの資産という新たなクラスとして扱った。
Story Protocolはライセンスと権利プリミティブに注力しているため、IPは収益ベースのRWAとは異なり、投資の根拠が採用とネットワーク効果へとシフトしている。
移動の耐久性は、IPトークン化が測定可能なオンチェーン利用を生成できるかどうかにかかっている。これにより、現金やクレジットにとどまらず、実行可能な権利へとRWAが拡大する。
Story Protocolはライセンスと権利プリミティブに注力しているため、IPは収益ベースのRWAとは異なり、投資の根拠が採用とネットワーク効果へとシフトしている。
移動の耐久性は、IPトークン化が測定可能なオンチェーン利用を生成できるかどうかにかかっている。これにより、現金やクレジットにとどまらず、実行可能な権利へとRWAが拡大する。
翻訳
🚨 BREAKING: PRO-BITCOIN LEGISLATION IN THE U.S. 🇺🇸
Senator Cynthia Lummis has introduced a new bill to protect Bitcoin developers from being classified as money transmitters, shielding them from regulatory overreach and potential prosecution.
“This gives developers the clarity to build the future of digital finance—without fear.”
A major signal for open-source innovation, Bitcoin policy, and U.S. crypto competitiveness.
#Bitcoin #Crypto #BTC #Regulation
Senator Cynthia Lummis has introduced a new bill to protect Bitcoin developers from being classified as money transmitters, shielding them from regulatory overreach and potential prosecution.
“This gives developers the clarity to build the future of digital finance—without fear.”
A major signal for open-source innovation, Bitcoin policy, and U.S. crypto competitiveness.
#Bitcoin #Crypto #BTC #Regulation
原文参照
CoinRank デイリー・データレポート (1/13)｜政策的摩擦が続く中、米国暗号資産規制が遅延
米国の暗号資産市場構造法案の遅延が1月下旬にずれ込んだことは、DeFiの取り扱い、ステーブルコインの利子、政治的利害相反条項に関する未解決の論争を示している。短期的な規制の明確化の期待は冷え込んでいるが、このプロセスは立法的な失敗ではなく、議席獲得の動きを反映している。
チャールズ・ホジンソン氏がトランプ政権時代のミームコインを批判したことで、暗号資産の政治化が強調された。これにより、米国中心のプロジェクトに対する長期的な政策リスクプレミアムが上昇し、実質的な改革はさらに先送りされる見通しとなった。
チャールズ・ホジンソン氏がトランプ政権時代のミームコインを批判したことで、暗号資産の政治化が強調された。これにより、米国中心のプロジェクトに対する長期的な政策リスクプレミアムが上昇し、実質的な改革はさらに先送りされる見通しとなった。
原文参照
COINRANK イブニングアップデート
ドバイがプライバシー通貨を禁止し、#ステーブルコインの規制を強化した
Caixin：東南アジアのギャンブル王であるシェ・ロンカイのブロックチェーンプロジェクトが、BCBベースの決済アプリ「Fincy」と関連している
QCP Capital：連邦準備制度の独立性に関する論争が市場のリスク回避志向を引き起こし、BTCは上昇した後、下落した
SlowMist：#Truebitのセキュリティインシデントは、コントラクトにオーバーフロー保護メカニズムが欠けていたことが原因である
#Polymarket は中国語版を開発中です
#CoinRank #GN
Caixin：東南アジアのギャンブル王であるシェ・ロンカイのブロックチェーンプロジェクトが、BCBベースの決済アプリ「Fincy」と関連している
QCP Capital：連邦準備制度の独立性に関する論争が市場のリスク回避志向を引き起こし、BTCは上昇した後、下落した
SlowMist：#Truebitのセキュリティインシデントは、コントラクトにオーバーフロー保護メカニズムが欠けていたことが原因である
#Polymarket は中国語版を開発中です
#CoinRank #GN
原文参照
ELON MUSK INTERACTS WITH POLYMARKET 25 TIMES ON X, INCLUDING 9 INTERACTIONS OVER THE PAST MONTH
暗号資産のKOLが追跡したデータによると、X、テスラ、スペースX、xAIのオーナーであるマスク氏 @elonmusk は、X上で繰り返し #Polymarket に関与しており、#prediction 市場における彼の存在感が高まっていることが示されています。
#ElonMusk #CryptoMarket
#ElonMusk #CryptoMarket
原文参照
TETHER、トロン上の5つのウォレットにわたり1億8200万ドル相当のUSDTを凍結
原文参照
COINRANK メディアムデイアップデート
インドはマネーロンダリングおよびテロ資金調達に対抗するために#cryptocurrency 規制を強化している
#JPMorgan Chaseは2026年に連邦金利引き下げを予測しなくなった
H100グループはスイスのビットコイン財務会社Future Holdings AGを買収する計画を立てている
Polyculeはラグプルを経験したように見える；ユーザーの資金は引き出されていないままとなっている
Vitalik: #Ethereum 自身が「簡単に離脱できる」ことをテストに合格しなければならない。
#CoinRank
#JPMorgan Chaseは2026年に連邦金利引き下げを予測しなくなった
H100グループはスイスのビットコイン財務会社Future Holdings AGを買収する計画を立てている
Polyculeはラグプルを経験したように見える；ユーザーの資金は引き出されていないままとなっている
Vitalik: #Ethereum 自身が「簡単に離脱できる」ことをテストに合格しなければならない。
#CoinRank
原文参照
CoinRankデイリーデータレポート (1/12)｜LISAは24時間で76％のフラッシュクラッシュを経験しました
LISAは24時間で76％のフラッシュクラッシュを経験し、3人のAlphaユーザーが保有資産を売却したことで、価格が急落しました
JPMorgan Chaseは2026年の連邦金利引き下げを予測しなくなりました
トレーダーが「I'm Here」トークンの取引で85ドルを146,600ドルに増やしました
韓国が企業向け暗号資産投資の9年間の禁止を解除し、上場企業が暗号資産に投資できるようにしました
CoinRankデイリーデータレポートへようこそ。このコラムシリーズでは、CoinRankが重要なデイリーキューバトコインデータニュースを提供し、読者が暗号資産市場の最新動向を素早く理解できるようにします。
JPMorgan Chaseは2026年の連邦金利引き下げを予測しなくなりました
トレーダーが「I'm Here」トークンの取引で85ドルを146,600ドルに増やしました
韓国が企業向け暗号資産投資の9年間の禁止を解除し、上場企業が暗号資産に投資できるようにしました
CoinRankデイリーデータレポートへようこそ。このコラムシリーズでは、CoinRankが重要なデイリーキューバトコインデータニュースを提供し、読者が暗号資産市場の最新動向を素早く理解できるようにします。
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