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Here is a detailed, cross-checked technical briefing on the Russian economy in 2025, based entirely on the most recent and reliable data available (including IMF projections, national statistics, customs data, and macroeconomic forecasts). Wherever possible, I’ve provided explicit sources for verification.
🧾 2025 Russian Economic Overview – Key Technical Data
1) GDP & Growth
Nominal GDP (2025 forecast)
Russia’s nominal GDP is projected to be approx. $2.08 trillion USD in 2025. (Lloyds Bank Trade)
GDP Growth (Real)
IMF forecasts ~0.6 % growth in 2025, reflecting a sharp slowdown from earlier robust rates. (Reuters)Other international forecasts vary widely:
• European Commission: 0.8 % growth projected for 2025. (Interfax.ru)
• Russian Ministry of Economic Development (optimistic “fragmented” scenario): ~2.5 %. (РБК)Independent sources note slow or near-stagnant real growth with weakening industrial output and lower oil revenue contributions. (Business Insider)
Annual GDP Trend (IMF projections)

YearNominal GDP (USD)Real Growth (%)GDP per Capita (USD)2024≈ 2.16 trn~4.1 %~14,7952025≈ 2.08 trn~1.5 % (IMF est.)~14,258(IMF WEO data projections) (Lloyds Bank Trade)
2) Inflation & Monetary Policy
Consumer inflation is projected at around ~9.3 % average for 2025 (followed by expected moderation in later years). (Lloyds Bank Trade)The Central Bank maintained elevated interest rates (~17–21 %) during much of 2025 to curb inflation. (Reuters)
This combination of modest growth plus high inflation constitutes a stagflation-like dynamic.
3) Government Finance: Debt & Deficit
Government Debt (2025 Forecast)
Gross government debt: approx. 21.4 % of GDP. (Lloyds Bank Trade)The IMF projection indicates a gradual increase trend in public debt levels. (GOV.UK)
Budget Balance
The government budget is expected in mild deficit (~−1.6 % of GDP). (Lloyds Bank Trade)Budget pressures arise primarily from lower oil prices and high defense spending requirements.
❗ Note: Russian statistics do not publish a consolidated “foreign government debt” equivalent to external sovereign bonds in the same way Western statistical agencies do; external debt figures are less standardized and often wrapped in broader financial sector flows.
4) External Sector: Trade, Exports & Imports
External Trade (Goods & Services)
Official statistics for January–October 2025 show:
Total foreign trade volume: ~ $564.2 billion USD (down ~3.5 % y/y). (infranews.ru)Exports: ~ $340 billion (~4–5 % decline). (infranews.ru)Imports: ~ $224 billion (down ~2–3 %). (infranews.ru)
Major trends:
Trade flows remain heavily weighted toward Asian partners, especially China, though overall export values are down due to falling energy prices and weaker global demand. (infranews.ru)Trade with “friendly states” (non-Western markets) accounted for ~80 % of total trade by late 2025—a sharp increase from earlier years. (tadviser.ru)
Trade Balance & Current Account
The goods trade surplus persists, but the current account surplus shrinks, reflecting a relative rise in service and investment income deficits. (Central Bank of Russia)
5) Labor Market
Unemployment (2025 forecast)
Unemployment is projected to be ~2.8 % in 2025. (Lloyds Bank Trade)IMF and other sources report continued tight labor markets and low official unemployment rates. (Le Monde.fr)
Note: Russian unemployment figures are typically measured in a narrower sense than in many Western economies and may understate labor slack.
6) Income & Wealth Indicators
GDP per Capita (Nominal)
Russian GDP per capita is forecast at approx. $14,258 in 2025. (Lloyds Bank Trade)
Wealth Distribution & Inequality
Russia’s wealth inequality data (e.g., GINI) are not consistently updated in international databases for 2025; regional analyses indicate substantial spatial disparities and income inequality exacerbated by sanctions and differential industry growth. (Wikipedia)
7) External Debt & Reserves
Foreign/External Debt Position
According to trading data, Russia’s external debt stands at roughly $308–$322 billion USD (central bank and external liabilities). (Trading Economics)
Foreign Reserves
Russian reserve assets (excluding IMF SDR allocations) have been under pressure due to sanctions and balance of payments adjustments, but remain significant in size (no precise consolidated figure publicly available for 2025). (Central Bank of Russia)
8) Structural & Sectoral Notes
Energy Sector
Oil & Gas export revenues for 2025 are estimated to decline by ~15 % compared to 2024 forecasts, reflecting lower prices and sanctions effects. (Reuters)Energy remains the dominant export category, though diversification is limited. (Wikipedia)
Defense & Industrial Base
High defense spending continues, absorbing fiscal space and contributing to GDP statistics. (Institute of New Europe)
Foreign Trade Patterns
Export orientation is increasingly toward Asia, Middle East, Africa, while trade with EU and Western markets has stagnated or declined due to sanctions. (tadviser.ru)
Key Technical Summary (2025)

Methodology & Reliability Notes
GDP and macro forecasts are drawn from IMF World Economic Outlook and international projections. (Lloyds Bank Trade)Trade figures are based on Russian Federal Customs Service published data (through Oct 2025). (infranews.ru)Unemployment and debt ratios use IMF aggregate projections and national statistics harmonized with WEO. (Lloyds Bank Trade)Russian official data may understate challenges due to methodological differences and sanctions-related reporting gaps.

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Zde je ověřený, přesný, založený na datech seznam zemí, které disponují nejdůležitějšími zásobami řídkých zemí (REE) — zaměřeným na geopolitickou, technologickou a ekonomickou strategickou důležitost. Zahrnuje odhadované podíly globálních zásob a výrobních kapacit, stejně jako které prvky řídkých zemí (REE) jsou v jejich zásobách nejzastoupenější, kde jsou tyto údaje spolehlivě dostupné.
📌 Co jsou „řídké země“
Řídké země (REE) tvoří skupinu 17 kovových prvků — 15 lanthanidů plus yttrium a skandium — které jsou nezbytné pro pokročilou elektroniku, obranné systémy, technologie čisté energie (např. elektrické vozy a větrné turbíny), telekomunikace a přesné přístroje. (Worcester Polytechnic Institute)

Poznámka: Organizace spojených národů má 193 členských zemí, a všechny 193 země mají právo hlasovat ve Valném shromáždění OSN.

Zde je **ověřený seznam zemí a mezinárodních organizací, které veřejně vydaly oficiální prohlášení prostřednictvím svých vládních orgánů v reakci na nejnovější akci Spojených států (např. vojenská operace v Venezuelě, zatčení Nicoláse Madura a související konfiskace tankových lodí). Tato data jsou založena na oficiálních prohlášeních vlád, která byla zveřejněna důvěryhodnými zdroji – ne na reakcích z sociálních médií, neoficiálních komentářích nebo shrnutích analytiků – s uvedením zdrojů:

1. Direct Financial Impact on the U.S. Economy
a. Military Expenditures
There is no official public estimate yet of the total military cost of the operation (troop deployment, equipment, logistics). It is likely to be large but not yet quantified in public budgets.
However:
Economists warn that “military adventures cost money” and that such operations can add to the federal deficit, which was already over $38.5 trillion in U.S. national debt entering 2026. Any additional unbudgeted military spending adds to that deficit and increases annual interest obligations. This can crowd out spending on domestic priorities (healthcare, infrastructure) and potentially raise borrowing costs for households and businesses. (Yahoo Finance)
b. Debt & Deficit Implications
The U.S. budget deficit for FY 2026 was already substantial (hundreds of billions) and Treasury economists suggest military operations can deepen it. (Yahoo Finance)This does not mean specific cost figures (e.g., “$X billion spent”) are yet public, but analysts compare it to prior conflicts like Iraq/Afghanistan which cost $2–5 trillion (including long-term care costs) — indicating that protracted overseas operations can have multi-trillion-dollar impacts over decades. (Foreign Affairs Forum)
c. Market Reactions
Initial market reaction in late trading was mixed: U.S. stock indices rallied notably, led by energy sectors, suggesting investors saw limited short-term economic risk. (Yahoo Finance)

Why Precise Numbers Aren’t Available
The U.S. government typically:
Does not immediately publish detailed operational costs for specific missions.Releases defense cost estimates in broader budget justifications or post-action analyses months or years later.Often clusters such costs under general global operations and readiness accounts — making precise attribution difficult in real time.
What This Means
The immediate tactical cost of the Venezuela operation — based on reasonable unit cost models — appears relatively modest in defense budget terms (tens of millions), but this doesn’t capture longer-term commitments that may arise.Broader governance, humanitarian, stabilization, and reconstruction costs — if the U.S. takes on any of those — could run into the billions per month, depending on policy choices and how quickly Venezuelan oil revenue is restored or redirecteVd.

1. Baseline: Current Annual Oil Revenue in Venezuela
Existing Oil Revenue
Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA earned about $17.5 billion in oil export revenue in 2024. This reflects limited production/export capacity under sanctions and infrastructure decline. (Energy News)
This is not the full potential — it’s what the industry actually generated under current fractured conditions.
2. Estimated Revenue Under U.S. Management / Expanded Production
To estimate future revenue under U.S. management, analysts typically project higher production and exports, assuming sanctions are lifted and investment flows in. Here are plausible scenarios:
Scenario A — Moderate Recovery
1.3–1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) within a few years — a level some analysts see as realistic with major investment. (Reuters)At ~$55–$60 per barrel (near recent oil prices), annual revenue would be:1.3 million bpd × 365 days × $57/barrel ≈ $27 billion/year
1.4 million bpd × 365 days × $57/barrel ≈ $29 billion/year
So under this scenario, annual oil revenue might be ~$25 billion – $30 billion once production is meaningfully restored.
Scenario B — Major Recovery
If U.S. management and investment restored output further, say toward 2.0–2.5 million bpd over a longer term (a level approximating Venezuela’s pre-decline output potential):2.0 million bpd × 365 × $57 ≈ $42 billion/year
2.5 million bpd × 365 × $57 ≈ $52 billion/year
So in a more aggressive development scenario, annual revenue could reach ~$40 billion – $50 billion or more.
Note: These calculations assume oil prices around current levels and do not include refining margins, service revenue, or potential value from derivatives/petrochemicals.
Other resources (gas, minerals) could add more revenue, but the bulk is clearly from oil. Natural gas production in Venezuela is underdeveloped and would take major investment to generate substantial export revenue. (Congress.gov)
3. Military Operation Cost (for Comparison)
Based on currently available estimates and modeling:
Estimated direct military cost: ~$25 million–$150 million for the initial operation.A plausible best-guess midrange estimate is ~$60 million for the tactical capture phase.Some analysts also consider broader stabilization costs could be billions per month if the U.S. subsidized Venezuela’s government operations — but those are separate from the direct operation cost.
So for comparison, even the upper bound of the direct military cost is small relative to projected oil revenue. If you use $150 million as the “high cost”:

Key Assumptions & Uncertainties
1. Production Levels
Current production is well below full capacity (~0.8–1.0 million bpd). (Energy News)Estimates toward 1.3–2.5 million bpd assume significant investment, repair of infrastructure, and lifting of sanctions. (Reuters)
2. Oil Prices
Revenue estimates depend heavily on global oil prices, which fluctuate. Prices higher than ~$57/barrel would boost total revenue.
3. Costs vs. Revenue
Revenue ≠ profit. Net revenue to the U.S. (or firms) depends on production costs, royalties, operating costs, taxes, and contractual terms.
4. Other Resources
Natural gas and minerals (gold, iron, rare earths, etc.) could add long-term income, but oil remains the dominant revenue source.
Summary
Estimated Annual Revenue (under U.S.-managed recovery)
Moderate scenario: ~$25 billion–$30 billion/yearAggressive recovery: ~$40 billion–$50 billion+/year
Comparison to U.S. Operation Cost
Direct military cost: ~$25M–$150M (≈$60M best estimate).Revenue could be ~166× to ~833× greater annually than the military cost, depending on production levels and cost assumption.

Bottom Line: Even conservative estimates suggest that oil revenue under restored production would dwarf the initial cost of the military operation by orders of magnitude, but these projections assume significant investment, infrastructure rehabilitation, and a favorable political/economic environment — none of which are guaranteed and would take years to achieve.

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Ázie
Protesty v Iránu se rozšiřují — celostátní stávky, střety s bezpečnostními silami pokračují. (Wikipedia)
Bezpečnostní napětí v východní Asii — vojenská pozice Číny kolem Tchaj-wanu a regionální námořní soutěž. (News.com.au)
Strategická soutěž mezi USA a Čínou — včetně námořních pohybů v Arktidě, které vyvolávají geopolitické obavy. (The Wall Street Journal)
Ekonomické změny v Číně — služby a obavy z růstu jsou hlášeny na regionálních trzích. (The Economic Times)
Klimatické a vodní problémy v Jižní Asii — rostoucí tlak na vodní zdroje Himalájí (dlouhodobý strukturální problém). (Wikipedia)